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[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Chief Justice Burger, you are absolutely right.
But if the State mandated a life sentence for one parking ticket...
we have no doubt that the Court would find that sentence excessive.
No question ofQuestion (Burger): You are dealing with one parking ticket or three
parking tickets, here, are we?
[Defense Counsel]: Even three parking tickets, your Honor.
Question (Burger): We are not dealing with them in this case.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 26, 1973, William James Rummel was sentenced to spend the
2
rest of his life in a Texas prison because he was an habitual offender.
During a nine-year period, Rummel was found guilty of three felonies. In
that "crime spree," Rummel amassed $229.11 in criminal earnings. On
March 18, 1980, the United States Supreme Court, by a five-to-four margin, declared that Texas could constitutionally so punish Rummel because
the punishment was not prohibited by the cruel and unusual punishment
3
clause of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.
4
The decision received widespread lay attention, generally critical. It
deserves even more serious academic consideration. Although the potential effect of the decision on William Rummel is painfully clear, 5 the impact of Rummel on the criminal law is less obvious. It does appear,
however, that the case should have a substantial negative impact on the
criminal justice system. The decision may virtually immunize all habitual
offender statutes, no matter how severe, from eighth amendment constitu1. Oral Argument in the Supreme Court of the United States at 19, Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Oral Argument].
2. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266 (1980).
3. Id. at 285. The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIll.
4. E.g., Collect $230 and Go To Jail, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1980, at 14; Editorial, Cruel as Usual, THE NATION, Apr. 5, 1980, at 387; Strict Views of the Law, NEwsWEEK, Mar. 31, 1980, at 40. But see Kilpatrick, Justice Rehnquist vs. Justice Powell, Wash.

Star, Mar. 29, 1980, § A, at 1I, col. I.
5. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's denial of Rummel's eighth amendment claim,
which is the subject of this Article, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Texas granted Rummel's application for writ of habeas corpus. Rummel v. Estelle, SA-76-

CA-20 (W.D. Tex. 1980). After conducting an evidentiary hearing, Senior United States
District Judge D.W. Suttle concluded that "the total failure of Rummel's [court appointed

trial] lawyer to contact any potential witnesses and to even attempt to investigate the case,
prejudiced Rummel enough to require [pursuant to the sixth and fourteenth amendments
right to counsel] a new trial." Id., slip op. at 7.
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tional scrutiny. More broadly, the decision could spell the death-knell of
the eighth amendment "proportionality" doctrine in nondeath penalty sentencing decisions.6 Even more seriously, the case undercuts certain vital
philosophical premises of the criminal law. 7 As a result, Rummel may
frustrate various reform8 efforts and hasten regressive efforts in the substantive criminal law field.
Justice Rehnquist, in another forum, has properly called for reasoned
and objective analysis of Court opinions. 9 This Article attempts that type
of analysis of Rummel.
After discussing the legal and philosophical background for Rummel,
this Article demonstrates that the majority opinion in Rummel is poorly
crafted, displays an inappropriate deferential attitude to legislative bodies,
is jurisprudentially unsound, and was affected by inappropriate arguments
and concessions by the parties.' 0 In addition, this Article explains the
likely impact of Rummel on criminal law doctrine and suggests possible
avenues for continued litigation and argument. "
This Article is intended to be an objective, but impassioned, call to action. Too often in the past substantive criminal law has been the stepchild
of the criminal justice system, and the legal profession has failed in its
responsibility to protect fundamental rights implicated by the substantive
criminal law. Practicing lawyers have at times demonstrated insensitivity
to, or ignorance of, important jurisprudential principles, and the direction
of the substantive criminal law has been affected by such professional
shortcomings. Furthermore, decisions implicating the substance of the
criminal law have too often suffered
from poor craftsmanship or jurispru2
dential error by the judiciary. '
The legal community as a whole seems at times to view criminal procedure as the more important, or more interesting, subject. Yet, substantive
criminal law is paramount. Whether a citizen is assured a lawyer at a trial
matters little to the overall concept of justice if he may be tried for the
crime of tuberculosis. Fairly apportioned burdens of proof between
"crime" and "defense" are meaningless if the legislature may deny an insane person the defense of his madness. Limits on the state's right to use
two prior larcenies to prove guilt in a third theft case are of small consolation to the person whose prior crimes can be used to justify a mandatory
13
sentence of life imprisonment after he is convicted for the third theft.
The intent of this Article is to demonstrate to both the judiciary and the
6. See notes 407-49 infra and accompanying text.

7. See notes 360-400 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 456-66 infra and accompanying text.
9. Rehnquist, Act Well Your Part, Therein All Honor Lies, 9 HUMAN RIGHTS 42

(1980).
10. See generally notes 229-405 infra and accompanying text.
11. See generally notes 405-66 infra and accompanying text.
12. See generally notes 172-228 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Fletcher, The Theory of CriminalNegligence: A ComparativeAnalysis, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 401, 436-37 (1971); Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 411 (1958).
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legal community in general not only the objective need for reform of the
criminal justice system, but more significantly, the need for a reasoned and
jurisprudentially aware judiciary that can become actively involved in the
reform. Rummel serves both as evidence of the problem and as a starting
point for the solution.
II.

RUMMEL: THE HOLDING

14

On August 15, 1972, David Lee Shaw gave William Rummel a check for
$120.75 in return for the latter's promise to repair or replace Shaw's defective air-conditioning compressor. Rummel attempted unsuccessfully to
purchase a new compressor, and, upon failing that, to retrieve the old air
conditioner, He never performed the repairs, however, even after cashing
Shaw's check.' 5 Rummel was indicted and convicted of obtaining the
money under false pretenses. Although the Texas Legislature later reclassified the crime as a misdemeanor,' 6 it was a felony in 1973.' 7 The indictment also cited Rummel's two prior convictions: presenting a credit card
with the intent to defraud another of approximately $80.00, and passing a
forged instrument with a face value of $28.36. Both acts were felonies in
Texas at the time of their commission.' 8 Pursuant to a Texas recidivist
statute that mandated life imprisonment for any three-time felon,19 Rummel received a sentence of life imprisonment. Obtaining money under
false pretenses, without such enhancement, carried a two- to ten-year
prison sentence. 20 Under the enhanced sentence, Rummel would become
eligible for parole consideration after approximately twelve years in
2
prison. '
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, 22 and
Rummel's applications for post-conviction relief in the Texas courts were
14. Because the author takes issue with the Court's craftsmanship, precise details and a

large quantity of direct quotes from the opinion are necessarily included in the treatment of
the decision itself.
15. Brief for the Petitioner in the Supreme Court of the United States at 4-5 n.2, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief]. Shaw originally
agreed to release Rummel from any claims concerning the checks, but he later changed his
mind, triggering Rummel's fate. Id.
16. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see 445 U.S. at
295.
17. Tex. Penal Code Ann. arts. 1413, 1421 (Vernon 1953).
18. Id. arts. 996 (Vernon 1961), 1555b(4)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1973).
19. "Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than capital shall
on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary." Id. art. 63 (Vernon
1952). This statute has been recodifed, with minor changes, as TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
20. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 1421 (Vernon 1953).
21. 445 U.S. at 280. This figure is based on Texas's system of "good time credits." In
oral argument the Texas attorney general claimed that parole release was so "overwhelming
in his case that it is virtually impossible [that he will serve a life sentence]." Oral Argument,
supra note 1, at 25. He also reported to the Court that Rummel was a prison "trustee," a
fact that could reduce his prison sentence to 9 years. Id. at 29-30. Such good time credits,
however, may be revoked at any time, in a system "that has a free giving and taking of the
good time." Id. at 30.
22. 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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denied without hearing. 23 He sought habeas corpus relief in the federal
district court, claiming that his punishment was grossly disproportionate
and therefore in violation of the eighth amendment. The district court also
denied his petition without hearing. 24 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the district court ruling. 25 Although a panel of the court
concluded that enhahced punishment was appropriate, it found the life
sentence to be "grossly disproportionate to [any] rational penological objective"2 6 served in the case.
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel opinion, and in an
27
eight-to-six decision affirmed the district court's denial of the petition.
Treating Rummel's sentence as twelve years in view of the parole possibility, it declared the penalty not "so greatly disproportionate . . . as to be
completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice. '2 8
Eight years after Rummel committed the crime of false pretenses, the
Supreme Court of the United States approved the life sentence on proportionality grounds. 29 Justice Rehnquist, writing for Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, 30 White, and Blackmun, initially noted two concessions made by Rummel. 3 1 First, he had conceded the general validity of
32
habitual offender statutes that enhance punishment of repeat offenders.
Secondly, Rummel had conceded the authority of Texas to punish each of
his crimes "as felonies, that is, by imprisoning him in a state penitentiary."'33 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist pointed out, Rummel "could have
received sentences totaling 25 years in prison for what he refers to as his
'petty property offenses.' "34 The Court also emphasized that thirty-four
other states treated Rummel's third crime as a felony, 35 and that "a large
number of States authorized significant terms of imprisonment" for Rummel's other crimes. 36 In light of Rummel's concessions, the Court framed
the issue in controversy to be "the State's authority to impose a sentence of
as opposed to a substantial term of years, for his third
life imprisonment,
37
felony."
The Court's holding is not altogether clear. Essentially, however, its reasoning was as follows: (1) the Court is reluctant to review legislatively
mandated terms of imprisonment; (2) it will not review such legislation
23. See 568 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1978).
24. Id.
25. 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978).

26. id. at 1198.
27. 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
28. Id. at 655 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1962)).
29. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). But see note 5 supra.
30. Justice Stewart also wrote a one paragraph concurrence in which he reiterated his
belief that the Texas law was unenlightened. 445 U.S. at 285.
31. Id. at 268.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 269.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 269-70.
37. Id. at 270-71.
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unless it can do so by application of objective factors that result in a bright
line conclusion of gross disproportionality; (3) sufficient bright line objectivity was absent in this case; therefore, (4) Texas could constitutionally
punish recidivist Rummel as it did.
The Court developed the first two arguments on the grounds of precedent. It conceded that on occasion it had "stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime."'38 It observed, however, that the proportionality
proposition had in recent years more frequently appeared in death penalty
cases. 39 Because the Court had repeatedly spoken of the death penalty as
unique in kind compared to any sentence of imprisonment, regardless of
length, it decided that eighth amendment death penalty40 decisions were
only of limited assistance in Rummel's noncapital claim.
In noncapital cases, the Court observed, "successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare."'4 ' The
Court's discussion focused on Weems v. United States,42 the first opinion to
hold that the eighth amendment had a proportionality component. In
Weems the defendant was a Philippine public official convicted of falsifying two items on official documents. Under the Philippine statute in question, a twelve-year-and-one-day prison sentence was mandated for one
falsification. Falsification of an entire document allowed a twenty-year
prison sentence. There was no adaptable relation for intermediate cases.
The statute required neither proof of injury, nor a demonstration of a desire for gain on behalf of the actor. The sentence under the law necessarily
also included certain "accessories": hard labor, wrist and ankle chains,
life-time surveillance, and perpetual disqualification from office. Weems
received a fifteen-year prison sentence along with the accessories. The
United States Supreme Court declared such punishment unconstitutional
43
under the proportionality doctrine.
Speaking for the majority in Rummel, Justice Rehnquist stated that
Weems's finding of disproportionality could not be "wrenched" from the
"extreme" and "peculiar" facts of that case: 44 "the triviality of the charged
offense, the impressive length of the minimum term of imprisonment, and
the extraordinary nature of the 'accessories' included within the punishment."' 45 Rejecting the argument that the length of imprisonment, by itself, was a sufficient basis for the result, Justice Rehnquist noted that, as
with the death penalty decisions, the uniqueness of the punishment ex38.
39.
40.
the fact
Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 271.
Id. at 272.
Id. The Court attempted to undercut the decisions even further by taking note of
that the prior death penalty opinons it cited were plurality or dissenting statements.
Id.
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id. at 382.
445 U.S. at 274.
Id.
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plained the case. 46
The Rummel majority observed that in the past it had demonstrated its
"reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment. ' '4 7
Quoting Coker v. Georgia,4 8 the Court noted that "Eighth Amendment
judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of
individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to
the maximum possible extent."'49 In Coker capital punishment for the
crime of rape made it possible to draw a "bright line"; 50 in Weems the
accessories made it possible for the Court to enforce the eighth amendment
"in an objective fashion."'' S Such cases resulted in lines "considerably
clearer" 52 than any constitutional comparison between two differing terms
of imprisonment. Justice Rehnquist warned that "a more extensive intrusion into the basic line-drawing process that is pre-eminently the province
of the legislature" would be difficult to reconcile with the antisubjectivist
views expressed in Coker.5 3 The Court observed, therefore, in what shall
hereinafter be called the "without fear of contradiction" statement, that
"one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that
is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of
legislative prerogative. ' 54 In its footnote 11 explaining this statement,
however, the Court said without further elaboration that "[t]his is not to
say that a proportionality principle would not come into play in the extreme example. . . if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punish'55
able by life imprisonment.
In order to reinforce its interpretation of prior case law, the Court
pointed to two post-Weems decisions in which noncapital decisions were
found not to violate the eighth amendment. In 1912 in Graham v. West
Virginia,56 a case "factually indistinguishable" 57 from Rummel's claim,
' 58
the "Court did not tarry long on Graham's Eighth Amendment claim,"
declaring the use of the habitual offender law in that case constitutional.
In Graham the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for two thefts
of horses and one burglary for the purpose of theft of horses, in which the
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

49. Id. at 592.
50. 445 U.S. at 275. The term "bright line" in a proportionality context was apparently
used first in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603
(1977). It was used again in the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S 586 (1978).
51. 445 U.S. at 275.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 274 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 274 n.l i.
56. 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
57. 445 U.S. at 276.
58. Id. (footnote omitted).
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value of the booty was $310. In the 1916 case of Badders v. United States 59
the Court unanimously rejected a proportionality challenge to concurrent
sentences of five years imprisonment and $7,000 in fines for seven counts
of mail fraud. The Court in Badders said
that there was no basis for de60
claring the punishment unconstitutional.
Justice Rehnquist argued that Rummel had not provided sufficient objective criteria to prove the unconstitutionality of his sentence. Rummel
had applied three factors traditionally used in such cases. 6 1 First, he
claimed the pettiness of the offense mandated a lesser penalty. 62 Secondly,
on the basis of intrajurisdictional analysis, he argued that in Texas more
serious crimes received less severe punishment. 63 Thirdly, using an interjurisdictional approach, he showed
that all but two other states would
64
have punished him less severely.
Rummel attempted to characterize his crimes as petty because they were
nonviolent and involved only small amounts of money, but the Court rejected this argument. The Court observed that a distinction based on violence "does not always affect the strength of society's interest in deterring a
particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal," 65 that many nonviolent crimes are nonetheless serious, 66 and that some nonviolent crimes
might reasonably merit greater punishment than some violent ones. 67 Suggesting that some murders are not violent, as when they are committed by
poison, 68 the Court emphasized that such nonviolence never merits lesser
punishment. A line drawn on the basis of the amount of money stolen was
also viewed by Justice Rehnquist as subjective:
[T]o recognize that the State of Texas could have imprisoned Rummel
for life if he had stolen $5,000, $50,000, or $500,000, rather than the
$120.75 that a jury convicted him of stealing, is virtually to concede
that the lines to be drawn are indeed "subjective," and therefore prop69
erly within the province of legislatures, not courts.
The Court also observed that if Rummel had failed to defraud his victims,
70
he would have been no less blameworthy than if he had succeeded.
59. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
60. Id. at 394.
61. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (application of seriousness of offense and interjurisdictional approaches); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (ap-

plication of intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional approaches, noted immediately infra
in text); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1974) (application of all three tests); In re
Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 553 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976) (application of all three tests); In
re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (application of all three
approaches); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 NW.2d 827 (1972) (application of all
three tests).
62. 445 U.S. at 275-76.
63. See id. at 282-83 n.27. See also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 45-47.
64. 445 U.S. at 279.

65. Id. at 275.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 282-83 n.27.
Id.
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 276.
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The Court rejected the intrajurisdictional approach because it requires
evaluation of the comparative seriousness of crimes, and such a process is
inherently speculative, because seriousness of crimes "is not a line, but a
plane."' 7 1 After putting aside "punishments different in kind from fine or
imprisonment . . . there remains little in the way of objective standards"
for evaluating the proportionality of "a life sentence imposed under a recidivist statute for several separate felony convictions not involving 'violence.' " 72 Quoting Justice Frankfurter, Justice Rehnquist reiterated that
"severity of punishment, . . . [and] its efficacy or its futility, ...
are pe'73
culiarly questions of legislative policy."
The court also did not find Rummel's interjurisdictional argument entirely convincing. 74 It conceded that Rummel's detailed charts and tables
documenting recidivist laws in the United States demonstrated that he
would have received more lenient treatment in all but two other states. 75
Other statutes imposed mandatory life imprisonment only on the fourth,
rather than the third, offense, or only if one or more of the three felonies
was violent, while others made life imprisonment discretionary on the
third offense. 7 6 These distinctions, however, were viewed as "subtle rather
than gross."' 7 7 Rummel's charts did not begin to reflect the full complexity
of the comparison that Rummel encouraged the Court to make. 78 The
Court observed that Rummel was eligible for parole consideration in "as
little as [twelve] years."' 79 Agreeing that his inability to enforce any right
to parole precluded the Court from treating the sentence as one of twelve
years, it nonetheless "could hardly ignore . . . the possibility of parole,
however slim." 8 0° Further complicating the calculus was the role of
prosecutorial discretion that is used in any recidivist scheme to exclude
deserving cases. 8 ' The Court said that these considerations were not inherent flaws in the interjurisdictional analysis, but rather served "as illustrations of the complexities confronting any [reviewing] court."'8 2 Moreover,
the Court stated that even if it assumed that Texas had the most severe
punishment in the country, this fact would not render the punishment disproportionate. "Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to
traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State. '8 3
In a footnote the Court also observed the absence of another type of objective evidence used in prior cases, namely "contemporary expression of leg71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 282-83 n.27.
Id.
Id. (quoting Gore v. Unitei States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
445 U.S. at 279.
Id.
See id. at 279-80 nn.19-21.
Id. at 279.

78. Id. at 280.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 281.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 282.
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islative or public opinion on the question of what sort of penalties should
be applied to recidivists, or to those who have committed crimes against
property. ' 84 The Court concluded that any move to lighter sentences
"must find its source and its sustaining force in the legislatures, not in the
federal courts." 85 It stated that Texas is entitled to make its own judgment
of where to draw the line between felony and petty larceny, "subject only
to those strictures of the Eighth Amendment that can be informed by objective factors. ' 86 It expressly left open the question, however, of whether
Rummel's last crime of receiving $120.75 by false pretenses could result in
a life sentence. 87 As for recidivist laws,
[T]he interest of the State of Texas here is not simply that of making
criminal the unlawful acquisition of another person's property; it is in
addition the interest . . . in dealing in a harsher manner with those
who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society. . . . By conceding the
validity of recidivist statutes generally, Rummel himself concedes that
the State of Texas, or any other State, has a valid interest in so dealing
with that class of persons. 88
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the point at which a criminal becomes a
recidivist, and how much one may be punished for it, like the line between
felony and misdemeanor larceny, are "largely within the discretion of the
'89
punishing jurisdiction.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented. He rejected Justice Rehnquist's historical claim that the proportionality clause was less applicable in noncapital cases. To Justice Powell
the doctrine is equally applicable in cases involving length of imprisonment; therefore, the Court should have analyzed "the nature and number
of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon
the offender." 90 The majority should have focused on whether a person
deserves such punishment and "not simply on whether punishment would
serve a utilitarian goal." 9' Justice Powell did state, however, that recidivists could be more severely punished than first-time offenders. 92 Justice
Powell would have applied the three traditional proportionality tests to the
facts of the case and would have concluded that in combination they
demonstrated the gross disproportionality of Rummel's life imprisonment
sentence. Rummel's sentence would "be viewed as grossly unjust by virtually every layman and lawyer."' 93 As the state did not attempt to justify the
sentence as necessary either on grounds of general or of specific deter84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

280 n.22.
284.
276.
285.
288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
301.
307.
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rence, 94 in Justice Powell's opinion the line drawn by Texas was irrational 95 and in violation of the eighth amendment.
III.

RUMMEL IN CONTEXT

William Rummel believed that his sentence of life imprisonment in a
Texas prison was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the three
crimes that served as the basis for his sentence and argued that as a result
his sentence violated the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. Discussion of the validity of this claim and the propriety of the Court's rejection of that argument cannot be understood
without first putting the issue in its philosophical and legal context.
A.

PhilosophicalContext

1. The Principle of Personhood. In the United States, and in AngloAmerican law generally, we tenaciously hold to the ethical view that we, as
human beings, are unique entities, different as a species from other animals and different from inanimate objects. As a result of this difference
and believed superiority, we feel we are entitled to be treated better than
animals and machines. If we are treated like them our rights as persons
have been violated. This view of human rights may be identified in the
law as the "principle of personhood. ' 96 We come to this belief because
humans, unlike animals or machines, are thought to be capable of feeling
and expressing emotions of a sophisticated nature, such as love, loyalty,
and mercy. As a species we are also capable of making rational choices.
We have free will. We are not programmed to act as we do. We are not
ruled largely by instinct. Because of our choice-making capabilities,
humans are also individually unique. We are not fungible. Each of us will
respond to stimuli differently; each of us has a different personality. We
want the law, therefore, to allow people to act like humans. That is, laws
should ensure the freedom of persons to express feelings, to further their
creative desires, and to express their unique personalities. Likewise, we
want the law to treat us as humans, to treat us as unique personalities,
capable of emotions, and inherently different from, and better than, all
other living things and all inanimate objects.
Many features of American common and constitutional law are consistent with the principle of personhood. The personhood principle is at
work in classical contract law theory, which rests on the premise that persons can, and should be allowed to, make rational complicated choices
94. Id. at 302.
95. Id. at 307.

96. This concept was developed, although with use of different terminology and in a
slightly different context, in Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968).
See also J.RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-3 (1978); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Pleafor a Due Process Concept of
CriminalResponsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966); Richards, Human Rights and the Moral
Foundations of the Substantiye Criminal Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395 (1979). The author's

views on this matter follow most closely the ideas of Morris, supra.
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regarding the ordering of their lives. 97 The first and fourth amendments to
the Constitution have been held to protect different aspects of the human
right of privacy, partially because such privacy is necessary to further each
person's unique personality and to allow expression of unique human
emotions, such as love and caring. 98 The due process clause requires that
government treat its citizens, even those suspected of crime, in a fashion
that respects their human dignity. 99 It also often requires that persons be
judged and evaluated as individuals and not as members of larger
groups.10° In other words, justice should be distributed personally, not
collectively. Blame, and credit, should be individualized. Thus, laws that
irrebuttably presume the existence of a characteristic in a person on the
basis of that person's membership in a larger group are often held invalid,
even if most members of the group do possess that characteristic.' 0' This
concept of "distributive justice"' 10 2 is also found, as discussed later, in the
10 3
common law of crimes.
Of course, the principle of personhood and the resultant concept of distributive justice cannot stand if the initial premise that we differ from animals and objects is wrong, and this premise is false if in fact we lack free
will and if determinists are correct when they claim that our actions and
feelings are no more free than those of animals or machines. Theologians,
philosophers, and scientists continue to debate this question, but the law
does not. It conclusively rejects determinism. 1°4
Early shapers of the law may have rejected determinism because of their
own principled beliefs.' 0 5 Today, however, the rejection of determinism is
viewed by some as an acceptable legal fiction. 10 6 If determinists are correct, we can and must be treated like puppets, because we are no different
97. See L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965).
98. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 195, 50 S.E. 68, 70 (1905); Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962
(1964); Stone, The Scope of The Fourth Amendment. Privacy and the Police Use of Spies,
Secret Agents, andInformers, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1193, 1207; Warren &
Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890); Note, Privacy in the First
Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462, 1474 (1973). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 96, § 15-21, at
985-90.
99. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
100. Perry, Constitutional "Fairness" Notes on EqualProtection andDue Process, 63 VA.
L. REV. 383, 401 (1977).
101. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See generaly Perry,
supra note 100, at 406-13.
102. The concept of distributive justice was first developed by Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, ch. 3, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1006
(R. McKeon ed. 1941).
103. See text accompanying notes 124-39 infra.
104. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 282 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)

(quoting Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
105. E.g., I M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14 (London 1736) ("Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties, understanding and liberty of will.
...).
106. Silverman, Determinism, Choice, Responsibility and the Psychologist'sRole as an Expert Witness, 24 AM. PSYCH. 5, 6 (1969).
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from puppets. Determinism negates moral responsibility. 10 7 This negation means that involuntary incarceration of the blameless would be justifiable. Determinism would result in "overthrow of the basic principles
that make our free society possible."' 1 8 In short, we accept the premise
that humans possess autonomy because that is what we want to believe. 0 9
We want to be treated as humans.
2. Utilitarianismand Retributivism. While the position of the law regarding free will versus determinism is relatively clear, this lucidity is not to be
found in the common law treatment of the competing rationales of the
criminal law, utilitarianism and retributivism, and their relationship to the
principle of personhood. Early scholars and courts placed too great a focus on the purposes of the criminal law and too little on its limits, and
therefore the law did not expressly demonstrate an awareness of the principle of personhood and the concept of distributive justice included within
it.' 0
The danger to the principle of personhood in criminal law doctrine can
be appreciated by remembering the premises of the two contrasting philosophies underlying the law of crimes. Utilitarians believe that the sole purpose of the law is to augment the total happiness of the society and to
diminish its total pain. Both crime and its punishment are painful and
undesirable. As little punishment as necessary to prevent greater pain (i.e.,
crime) should be inflicted on persons."' Utilitarianism, therefore, is forward looking.12 Prior crime merits future punishment only to the extent
that such punishment results in greater future good. This result will occur
when persons make, as they will, rational choices to forego the benefits of
crime because the pain of punishment is greater.
Retributivism, on the other hand, is backward looking. Punishment is
justified by the wrongdoing itself, regardless of its future efficacy.," 3 The
wrongdoer is a free moral agent, someone who has chosen to commit the
antisocial act. By his willed decision he has destroyed the moral equilibrium of society and unjustly enriched himself at society's expense. His4
voluntary decision therefore gives society the right to punish the person. "
107.
(1969).
108.
109.

Branden, Free Will, Moral Responsibility and the Law, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 264, 265
Nord, The Mental Element in Crime, 37 U. DET. L.J. 671, 698 (1960).
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).

110. Dubin, supra note 96, at 346; Fletcher, The Right Deedfor the Wrong Reason: A
Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 293, 294 (1975).
111. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION IN THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 843 (Burtt ed. 1939); H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 39; Rawls, Two Concepts ofRules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3, 5 (1955).
112. Dressier, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another. Accessories and Capital Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 17, 21 (1979). See also Fletcher, supra note 110, at 302 (instrumentalism); Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examinationofthe Eighth
Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 847 (1972).
at 4-5.
113. Rawls, supra note 11l,
114. The right need not always be exercised. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 236 (1968); Morris, supra note 96, at 478. See also J.KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT

89 (1973).
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Punishment returns society to its equilibrium 115 and the actor to his moral
position in society, once again entitled to take advantage of its benefits.
Adherents of each philosophical view are legion. Early common law
was usually premised on retributivism; later, the utilitarian approach
predominated. 16 More recently, new support for retributivism has surfaced. "17 Largely, however, the new support is the result of a growing realization that the general justifying aim of the criminal law and its
punishment can and must be distinguished from the distribution of the
law's punitive features. Professor Hart first emphasized distributive justice, the question of who should be punished and how much the punishment should be, as an issue independent from the general justifying aim of
the criminal law. He argued that one could favor utilitarianism as the gen18
eral justifying aim, while favoring retribution in distribution.'
The importance of establishing this dichotomy lies in the fact that utilitarianism, although it may logically explain why society criminalizes certain conduct, conceivably suffers from the same evil as determinism:" 19
the potential violation of the principle of personhood. Utilitarians treat
persons as means to other ends. Individuals may be sacrificed for the impersonal common good. In the proper circumstances utilitarianism justifies the punishment of innocent people who have committed no social
harm and who do not intend to commit such harm. 120 It also can result in
incarceration of persons before they commit any antisocial act, based on
their propensities to commit dangerous acts. 12 ' Such imprisonment of innocent persons and of persons with dangerous propensities, however, violates the human dignity principle of personhood. Humans should be
punished because they act wrongfully, because they deserve punishment,
not because their punishment will serve some other end and not because
they might do something wrong in the future. Retribution only justifies
punishment when the person has in fact acted in an antisocial fashion.
Retributivists believe that the antisocial actor deserves to be punished because he is a free moral agent who has chosen his own fate and because he
is entitled to pay his price to the society so he may be returned to society as
a full partner in it. Retribution is consistent with the concept of human
dignity implicit in the principle of personhood. The focus is on the person
and his act and not on some speculative future event. The person is dignified by the acknowledgment of his free will, and he is respected enough to
115.

A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 47-49 (1976);

Morris, supra note 96, at 478.
116.

Morris, Introduction, 13 McGILL L.J. 534, 546-49 (1967); Radin, The Jurisprudence

of Death. Evolving Standards/or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 989, 1050 (1978).
117. See, e.g., von Hirsch, Giving Criminals Their Just Deserts, 3 CIv. LIB. REV., Apr.-

May 1976, at 23.
H. HART, supra note 114, at 8-13.
Morris, supra note 116, at 539.
120. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3.2, at 415 (1978); McCloskey, An
118.

119.

Examination ofRestricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 466, 468 (1957).

121. See H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 77-78; von Hirsch, Prediction ofCriminal Conduct
and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717, 746 (1972).
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be reestablished in moral equilibrium in society. The process of punishment occurs not just because it may be good for society but because it is
fair to the person.
Just as the principle of personhood is a part of other aspects of the common and constitutional law, it is without question a part of the common
law of crimes in the form of the retribution theory. Because of the focus of
the common law courts on the purposes and not the limits of the criminal
law,122 however, one finds little or no expression of the principle of personhood, as such, in substantive criminal law. Nevertheless, the23courts
seem to have acted largely with an intuitive sense of the principle. 1 Most
of criminal law doctrine is best explained by recourse to the idea of personhood. The common law requirement of a voluntary act resulting in
social harm, 124 for example, is far more easily justified in retributive than
utilitarian fashion. It ensures that a person will not be punished for his
propensity or as an object lesson, but only if he has made a choice to act
out his criminal propensities. As such, this rule is not only nonutilitarian,
but is potentially antiutilitarian. 125
The common law requirement of mens rea 126 is also more consistent
with the principle of personhood than with utilitarian values. 12 7 As a general proposition only utilitarianism is consistent with strict liability legislation. Several utilitarian reasons for strict liability legislation exist. First,
an innocent actor may be accident prone, dangerous, and in need of incarceration. Secondly, the absence of a general requirement of mens rea may
serve to make law-abiding persons more careful than in a system based on
mens rea. Thirdly, the absence of a mens rea requirement relieves the government of proving a difficult concept, thereby ensuring that those who do
act with improper motive are convicted. Fourthly, those who might commit a crime believing they can avoid conviction by proving lack of mens
rea will be deterred by strict liability rules, as this defense is then lost to
them. Punishment for violation of strict liability crimes and of persons
122. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
123.

Dubin, supra note 96, at 378. Although Dubin was writing about the Supreme

Court, the author believes that the common law courts are more deserving of the compliment.
124.

W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 177 (1972); R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 546 (2d ed. 1969). See generally G. FLETCHER, supra note 120, § 6.4; J.
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 171-246 (2d ed. 1960); H. PACKER, supra
note 109, at 73-79.
125. See generally H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 73-79.
126. Although ancient common law did not require a mens rea, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 124, at 192; R. PERKINS, supra note 124, at 739, it has been required since about
1600. Id. Excellent articles have been written that describe or defend this historical requirement. See, e.g., Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REV. 1043 (1958);
Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815
(1980); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932).

127. Some utilitarian justifications, however, do exist for the rule. For example, one who
lacks a criminal disposition is not in need of reformation. Similarly, specific deterrence of
such persons is unnecessary as they do not need to be intimidated or incapacitated. One
commentator has claimed that general deterrence fails as to innocent actors. G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 14, at 30 (2d ed. 1961).
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who lack a statutorily required mens rea is antipathetic to retributive principles.' 28 Although mens rea should be required to ensure that only those
deserving of punishment are punished, the requirement frustrates the utilitarian incarceration of innocent but dangerous persons.
Finally, defenses such as insanity and duress are often counterutilitarian.129 These excuses exculpate persons who commit socially harmful acts, but who suffer from internal circumstances that substantially
reduce their choice-making capabilities. Although such defenses can serve
a partial utilitarian purpose, 130 they mainly serve the retributive goal of
exculpating the blameless:' 3' those who suffer from so severe a disease
that they lack the required mental state for the crime or the volitional or
cognitive mechanisms necessary to perform a willed act, and those who act
as a result of an imminent threat that renders that person's conduct nearly
involuntary. Partial defenses, 32 as well, are retributivist, not utilitarian.
One such common law partial defense, diminished capacity, 133 was largely
an effort by the courts to ensure that punishment of the sane but severely
diseased actor approximated his degree of culpability. 134 Provocation, too,
is a common law means 135 to make punishment more nearly proportionate
36
to blameworthiness. 1
The traditional common law distinction between civil and criminal
sanction for antisocial acts is also largely the result of the principle of personhood. In both cases a person is involuntarily committed. The society,
however, views the two systems differently. The criminal process involves
punishment and blame; the civil process theoretically implicates treatment
without moral blame. 13 7 This distinction exists because our collective con128. It is impossible to justify the imposition of moral blame in the absence of mens rea.
The mens rea of negligence, although not subjective, can be a legitimate basis for moral
blame if the actor had the capacity to act more carefully. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 415-18.
129. H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 112; Dubin, supra note 96, at 341.
130. For example, since one cannot deter the insane, the insanity defense is consistent
with the utilitarian good of specific deterrence. G. FLETCHER, supra note 120, § 10.3.5, at
813; H. HART, supra note 114, at 40; H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 109.
131. G. FLETCHER, supra note 120, § 10.3.1, at 799-800.
132. A defense is partial if a person remains punishable, but of a lesser crime or degree
of crime. In a sense, however, such defenses are total. Provocation, for example, discussed
at notes 135-36 infra and accompanying text, results in the reduction of the punishable
crime from murder to manslaughter. The partial defense is total in that it serves as a complete acquittal of murder.
133. Diminished capacity, as such, has been recognized as a partial defense by various
courts. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 124, at 325-32.
134. See, e.g., People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
135. For a discussion of its origins and rationale, see 2 J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 697 (8th ed. 1892); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 184-93; 1
0. WARREN & B. BILAS, WARREN ON HOMICIDE §§ 85,90 (perm. ed. 1914); I F. WHARTON,
A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 422, 424-425 (11th ed. 1912); Ashworth, The Doctrine of
Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292 (1976).
136. Without the doctrine, the common law actor was subject to the death penalty. See
Ashworth, Sentencing in Provocation Cases, 1975 CRIM. L. REV. 553. The law takes cognizance of human frailty. Moreland, Re-Examination of the Law of Homicide in 1971. The

Model Penal Code, 59 Ky. L.J. 788, 805 (1971).
137. Hart, supra note 13, at 405-06; Morris, supra note 96, at 483.
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science does not countenance punishment when it cannot impose blame. 138
To treat the sick as if they were moral wrongdoers is cruel. Likewise, however, the bad should not be treated as if they are mad because this approach implies that all antisocial actors are sick and therefore not free
moral agents. 139 Utilitarians blur this distinction because they are interested only in lessening antisocial behavior, which both civil commitment
and criminal incarceration may accomplish.
3. Distributive Justice and Proportionalily. Criminal law doctrine is thus
generally framed in a fashion consistent with the principle of personhood.140 That principle includes a requirement that justice be distributed on individual, not collective, grounds. A brief but closer look at this
latter concept of distributive justice within the context of the principle of
personhood is necessary.
First, distributive justice is consistent with retributive rather than utilitarian principles because the principle of personhood requires that justice to
the individual not be subordinated to societal efficiency.' 4' Distributive
justice, therefore, is a core feature of the criminal law either because retribution is its general justifying aim or, pursuant to Hart's more realistic
thesis, it is a limit on utilitarian goals.142 Secondly, as a limit on utilitarianism, distributive justice requires that punishment be inflicted only on
morally guilty persons, that is, persons who have acted to cause a result
deserving of blame and who are also personally deserving of blame because they acted of their own free will.143 Thus, both act and actor must
be morally blameworthy. Thirdly, "[elven a vicious criminal, fairly convicted, ought not to be thought an outcast subject to any and all abuse."' 144
In short, desert is more than just a prerequisite to punishment, it is a yardstick for punishment. A core feature of the distributive justice concept of
the principle of personhood is that punishment be proportionate to that
person's personal guilt. 145 Otherwise, the society could use an act of social
disobedience as a basis to treat the person as a nonhuman forever. Although the guilty actor merits punishment and the innocent does not, pun138. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
139. See Morris, supra note 96, at 486-90. See also Morris, Psychiatryandthe Dangerous
Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 520 (1968).
140. There are various violations of this general premise: the "moral wrong doctrine";

the lack of a defense for reasonable mistake or ignorance of the criminal law; the felonymurder rule; and various aspects of accessorial and conspiratorial law such as the rule of
liability for the unintended but natural and probable consequences of one's assistance. See
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,supra note 124, at 360-65, 516-17.
141.

See J. RAWLS, supra note 96, at 69; Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing. Ac-

countability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO.
L.J. 975, 1090 (1978).
142. H. HART, supra note 114, at 9.

143. G. FLETCHER, supra note 120, § 6.3.2, at 415-16; R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS 32
(1979); Wheeler, supra note 112, at 846.
144. Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaringthe Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1773, 1802 (1970).
145. G. FLETCHER, supra note 120, § 6.3.2, at 415-16; von Hirsch, supra note 117, at 2628. See also ARISTOTLE, supra note 102 ("[The unjust is what violates the proportion.").

1080

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

ishment beyond his guilt is similar to punishing the innocent, because it
involves punishing the innocent part of that person. 146 To do so neither
brings society back to its proper equilibrium nor returns the actor to society, both of which are essential features of retribution and of the principle
of personhood. Punishment beyond the guilt involved is not fair punishment as defined by 47the personhood concept, but is personally unfair expedient punishment. 1
Although utilitarianism has a proportionality component, the proportionality involved in the principle of distributive justice is retributive. The
difference is significant. Retributive proportionality requires that punishment fit the moral egregiousness of the crime, taking into consideration the
48
harmfulness of the act and the personal blameworthiness of the actor.
Utilitarian proportionality, on the other hand, requires only that punishment be no more severe than is required to fulfill its deterrent goal. 149 So
viewed, punishment is calibrated to the harmfulness of the act, without
any necessary consideration of the personal characteristics of the actor, except to the extent that specific deterrence is at issue,' 50 and even then the
issue is not the moral blameworthiness of the actor, but only his or her
propensity for future crime. Moreover, the harmfulness of the act is
viewed differently by a utilitarian than by a retributivist. The former looks
not just at the individual act and its immediate consequences, but to its
general mischieviousness. To a utilitarian, a crime that is not easily deterred, though it may involve only minor social harm, merits more severe
punishment than a more serious but more easily deterred crime because
the utilitarian aim is to reduce the overall amount of crime rather than to
distribute punishment in a given case in relation to immediate social harm.
The punishment might therefore be higher for drunk drivers than for intentional killers and yet be theoretically proportionate in utilitarian
terms.' 5 ' Retributive proportionality rejects such a result.
These philosophical roots underlie the law, particularly the common law
of crimes. Although this basis does not mean, of course, that the principle
146. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 75 (1974).

147. From a purely philosophical point of view, of course, one can defend retributively
disproportionate punishment. One can simply reject the principle of personhood in favor of
pure utilitarianism. Alternatively, one can define justice as meaning that one should not
suffer retributively disproportionate punishment except when necessary to prevent a greater
societal harm. Goldman, The Paradox ofPunishment, 9 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 42, 52
(1979). So defined, however, justice still has a meaning contrary to the principle of per-

sonhood. Proportionality becomes nothing more than a presumptive rule. Utilitarian values
supersede it. Proportionality does not limit utilitarianism; utilitarianism limits the proportionality doctrine by expanding punishment. This type of justice is not based on the personhood principle. Rather, unjust punishment is obligatory for purposes of expediency.
McCloskey, ,4 Non- Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 249, 251 (1965); Wheeler,
supra note 112, at 847. Although expedient, this approach to justice is not justifiable if one

accepts the principle of personhood as the primary moral principle of our society. See also
notes 152, 346-48 infra and accompanying text.
148. R. SINGER, supra note 143, at 17; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 115, at 69.
149. J. BENTHAM, supra note I 1, at 843-44.
150. See id. at 845-46; Wheeler, supra note 112, at 848, 851.
151. Wheeler, supra note 112, at 851-52.
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of personhood is constitutionally required, any judicial interpretation of
the eighth amendment that diverges from the principle should be made in
full realization that it conflicts with52 paramount values of human dignity
fundamental to American society.'
B. Legal Context
The Supreme Court has incorporated the principle of personhood in the
eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, as
53
it did in first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment protections.'
Three separate lines of cases prior to Rummel confirm such a conclusion.
The principle is found in the early eighth amendment decisions of the
Supreme Court that prohibited as cruel and unusual those forms of punishment deemed barbaric at the time of the framing of the Constitution,
such as beheading, disemboweling, and quartering. 5 4 Although the death
penalty was not viewed as unconstitutional, 55 persons sentenced to death
were entitled by these decisions to have their lives taken in a fashion that
respected their basic personhood, as then understood. The techniques proscribed were those that troubled early Americans as being inhuman, as
treating both the executed and the executioner as less than full persons.
A second line of cases not involving torturous executions reinforced the
56
personhood principle. In the early decision of Weems v. United States
the Supreme Court concluded that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
' 57
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."'
This conclusion was reaffirmed in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles, 58 when the
Court said that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man"1'9 and that "[t]he Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."' 60 The Supreme Court has continued to
reaffirm this understanding in a third line of cases involving the death penalty, in which the dignity principle has been found to require certain extra
152. See N. MORRIS, supra note 146, at 75. The personhood principle, which historically
began as a "radical vision of human rights that underlies the Constitution and its view of the

criminal law," is one of primary value in the United States. Richards, supra note 96, at
1404. It also conforms with feelings many of us express on a daily basis. As already observed, the core of much of American law is consistent with the principle. See notes 97-101,
122-39 supra and accompanying text. Nonetheless, some common law rules conflict with
this principle. See, e.g., note 140 supra. Infliction of disproportionate punishment is also

not uncommon. Such violations, however, do not make excessive punishment just, only
frequent. See note 147 supra. Nor do such practices suggest that the personhood principle
is not a deeply held value, but only that society has at times deviated from it.
153. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
154. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).

155. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id.at 378.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id.at 100.
Id. at 101.

1082

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL

[Vol. 34

1

procedural regularities. 16
The Court has demonstrated that its dignity principle is similar to the
principle of personhood in two ways. First, its use of language in the cases
supports this conclusion. It talks of "human dignity" and "humane justice" and "decency." It does not speak in this context of the rationality of
utilitarian philosophy. The eighth amendment is intended to ensure decency-the principle of personhood-not rationality. 162 Secondly, the
Court has affirmed the concept of distributive justice.163 In Robinson v.
Calfornia164 the Court declared unconstitutional a statute that made it a
crime to be addicted to the use of narcotics. The Court held that the eighth
amendment prohibits punishment in which a voluntary act causing social
harm is lacking.165 As drug addiction is an involuntarily contractable disease, its punishment was invalid. 166 The Court also reinforced the importance of retaining the retributive-like difference between criminal and civil
commitment. It conceded that a state could civilly commit addicts for utilitarian reasons, but concluded that it could not use the stigmatizing criminal process to incarcerate them. 167 Furthermore, although it had
previously avoided such a conclusion,168 the Court held in Weems that "a
precept of justice [is] that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense." 169 According to this view, excessive punishment is cruel punishment. It is excessive if the punishment either "(1)
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and
hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime."' 70 The Court has twice found punishment unconstitutional under
the proportionality principle.171
161. Eg., Adams v. Texas, 444 U.S. 990 (1979); Godfrey v. Georgia, 444 U.S. 897 (1979);
Beck v. Alabama, 444 U.S. 897 (1979); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
162. People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004, loll (Monroe County Ct.
1974) (viewed issue as humanistic not legalistic); Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1964).
163. L. TRIBE, supra note 96, § 15-3, at 893 & n.10, interprets Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977), and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), as support for what he calls the
"right of personhood."
164. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
165. Id. at 666.
166. Id. at 667.
167. Id. at 666.
168. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
169. 217 U.S. at 367. That proportionality should be viewed as a nonutilitarian concept
in the Court's decisions stems from the Court's "decency" language. See note 162 supra and
accompanying text.
170. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
171. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910). Lower court reliance on Weems was delayed. Singer, Sending Men to Prison. Constitutional Aspects ofthe Burden of Proofand the Doctrineof the Least Drastic Alternative as
Applied to Sentencing Determinations,58 CORNELL L. REV. 51, 67 (1972); see, e.g., Perkins v.
State, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964) (20- 30-year prison sentence upheld for consensual
homosexual act); State v. Lee, 166 N.C. 256, 80 S.E. 977 (1914) (9 /-year sentence for 1 €
theft not excessive as matter of law). Weems was viewed by some as a dead letter. Turk-
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Personhood Litigation Not Involving Proportionality

The principle of personhood requires that only the morally guilty be
punished and that they be punished only to the extent of their blameworthiness.1 72 Robinson narrowly held that only persons who commit voluntary acts causing social harm may be punished, 73 but its implications
could have been broader; the case might have stood for the proposition
that only the morally blameworthy may constitutionally be punished. So
understood, particularly in conjunction with Weems, this interpretation
would have meant that (1) punishment of persons who lack a mens rea
would be unconstitutional; (2) legislative efforts174 to repeal common law
defenses such as insanity would be constitutionally invalid; and (3) legislative efforts to place the burden of persuasion regarding such defenses on
75
defendants would also be improper.
In fact, however, in the nonproportionality area the Court has consistently acted inconsistently, at times taking hesitant steps, at other times giant leaps toward implementing the principle of personhood, always later to
retreat from the apparent implications of such prior decisions by deferring
to legislatures. The Court has thus never demonstrated sensitivity to the
fact that Weems and Robinson could constitute acceptance of a broad portion of a much larger principle. Not only has the Court been insensitive to
the larger issues, but it has often reached poorly crafted decisions and also
manifested confusion regarding the jurisprudential doctrine before it. Further, the law has at time been skewed by the lack of interest in, or improper strategy of, lawyers litigating the criminal law issues. The handling
of criminal law principles of distributive justice has brought honor upon
176
neither the judiciary nor the legal profession as a whole.
The Court's inconsistency is obvious in three lines of cases. In the mens
rea area the Supreme Court first upheld the constitutionality of strict liability offenses without serious discussion. 17 7 Later, in Morissette v. United
ington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishment. An Examination of the Eighth Amendment
andthe Weems Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 145, 149-50 (1967). Nonetheless, in fairly recent
years, even before Coker was decided, the doctrine was "born again." See, e.g., cases cited
in note 61 supra.

172. See notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 164-67 supra and accompanying text.
174. Two such efforts were successful, but ruled unconstitutional by state courts. Sinclar
v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020
(1910). See § 522 of the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. REP. No. I, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), for an additional unsuccessful attempt.
175. The latter result flows from the idea that excuses affect the level of an actor's blameworthiness, see notes 129-36 supra and accompanying text, and to the extent that the due
process clause is intended to avoid criminal stigmatization of a person unless the state has
proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the state should have to carry the burden of
persuasion as to those defenses that acquit the person of moral blame. The author's point is
eloquently expressed by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
802 (1952).
176. "[Tlhe criminal law jurisprudence of the Court remains incomplete, inconsistent,
and unpersuasive .... " Dubin, supra note 96, at 378. That description, written in 1966, is
even more accurate today.
177. In Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910), the Court reached this
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States,178 in what Professor Herbert Packer considered a possible turning
point in judicial attitude toward mens rea, 179 the high court spoke for the
first time of mens rea as an ancient requirement,18 0 not "provincial or tran182
sient,"' 18 1 but "universal and persistent in mature systems of law."'
Later, in Lambert v. California, 83 the Court further intoned that "[a] law
which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community would be too severe for that community to
bear."' 18 4 In Lambert the Court held unconstitutional under the due process clause the punishment of a woman who was understandably ignorant
of a regulatory law that required her to register as a felon. Although Lambert seemed to require "a whole volume of the United States Reports...
to document in detail the legislation in this country that would fall or be
impaired,"' 185 the opinion turned out to be, as dissenting Justice Frankfurter predicted, "a derelict on the waters of the law."1 86 Subsequent cases
distinguished Morissette and Lambert. 187 The result, as Professor Packer
put it, is that "[mlens rea is an important requirement [of criminal juris88
prudence], but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes."1
In the field of criminal defenses, as well, the Court started slowly. In
Fisher v. United States,189 for example, it held that the due process clause
was not violated by the conviction and death sentence of a black defendant, who was denied a jury instruction that would permit the jury to consider the fact that he suffered from psychopathic aggressiveness, low
emotional responses, and borderline mental deficiency, even though he
had killed the victim after she had made racial slurs. Later, in Robinson v.
California,190 however, the Court treated drug addiction as a nonpunishable condition. The implications of Robinson for the law of excuses was
obvious. The case seemed logically to require the recognition of the distributive justice principle that the morally blameless not be punished for
those acts caused by conditions over which they had no control. Four Justices, including the author of the majority opinion, so understood its holding. 19 1 The extension of the holding to the insanity defense was clear in
conclusion in a dictum. This dictum became law in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250
(1922).
178. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
179. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 121.
180. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
181. 1d.
182. Id.
183. 355 U.S. 225 (1956).
184. Id. at 229 (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1946)).

185. Id. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Eg., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (intent not necessary to convict
corporate officer under Federal Food & Drug Act); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,

607-09 (197 I) (no scienter required to make constitutionally unlawful the possession of unregistered firearms).
188.
189.
190.
191.

Packer, supra note 179, at 107.
328 U.S. 463 (1946).
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), Justice Fortas, joined in dissent by Justices
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Justice Douglas's concurring opinion, in which he stated that "[ejach [the
insane person and the drug addict] has a disease and each must be treated
as a sick person."' 92 Not surprisingly, therefore, Robinson was hailed by
Professor Amsterdam as the "beginning of a new era of concern for substantive criminal law problems." 93 Six years later, however, the Court
abandoned the logical implications of the Robinson reasoning in Powell v.
Texas, 194 when it upheld the punishment of a chronic alcoholic for being
drunk in a public place. Rather than viewing Robinson as requiring the
recognition of the principle of personhood, the Court limited Robinson to
its facts, 19 5 rejecting the argument that "this Court has . . . articulated a
general constitutional doctrine of mens rea." 96 It distinguished Robinson,
which it viewed as predicated on the fact that that law punished "a mere
status," 197 from Powell, wherein the statute prohibited public conduct that
created substantial health and safety hazards. The latter type of statute
was held not to violate eighth amendment principles. 98
The same trend is even more dramatically observed in the area of burden of proof. In Leland v. Oregon 199 the Court held that a state could
place upon a defendant the burden of persuasion regarding the defense of
insanity. The dissent decried the result because it "obliterate[d] the distinction between civil and criminal law. '"2° ° Later, however, in In re Winship,20 1 the dissent's conclusion was cast in doubt when the Court declared
that a state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to
constitute the crime . . . charged. ' 20 2 The question whether the meaning
of the term "fact" included defenses seemed to be answered affirmatively
in Mullaney v. Wilbur,20 3 in which the Court overturned a long-time
Maine procedure that required a defendant to carry the burden of persuasion regarding his alleged heat of passion. The Court declared that "Win' 2 °4
ship is concerned with substance rather than . . . formalism.
Specifically, Winship was interpreted as serving to protect the critical interDouglas, Brennan, and Stewart, stated: "Robinson stands upon a principle... [that] is the
foundation of individual liberty and the cornerstone of the relations between a civilized state
and its citizens: Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change." Id. at 567. Justice White had expressed that belief in a
dissenting opinion in Robinson. "If it is 'cruel and unusual punishment' to convict appellant
for addiction, it is difficult to understand why it would be any less offensive . . . to convict
" Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 688 (1962).
him for use ....
192. 370 U.S. at 674.
193. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 234 (1967).
194. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 537.
343 U.S. 790 (1952).
Id. at 806 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 364.
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Id. at 699.
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ests of a defendant in the fact-finding process regarding "not only. . . [his]
guilt or innocence in the abstract but also . . . [his] degree of criminal
culpability. ' 20 5 As heat of passion affected the latter interest and was historically of great importance in making such a determination, 20 6 the state
had to carry the burden of persuasion. The opinion seemed to many to
spell the end of affirmative defenses, 20 7 to perhaps require mens rea as a
constitutional defense, 2°s and even to affect the burden of persuasion in
civil commitment cases. 20 9 Only two years later, however, the Court narrowed Mullaney as Powell did Robinson and subsequent cases did Lambert
and Morissete. In an opinion clearly inconsistent with Mullaney, the
Supreme Court in Patterson v. New York 210 admitted that "some language
in Mullaney . . . has been understood" 21' to require the state to carry the
burden of persuasion regarding affirmative defenses, but "[tihe Court did
not intend Mullaney to have such far-reaching effect."12 1 2 According to the
Patterson Court, the state must only carry
the burden of persuasion re21 3
garding prima facie elements of crimes.
In each of the three lines of cases, mens rea, criminal defense, and burden of proof, the Court demonstrated its lack of judicial sensitivity to the
relevance of the principle of personhood by expressly or impliedly indicat21 4
ing its belief that the issues were more appropriately legislative matters.
The mens rea and criminal defense cases were also poorly crafted, jurisprudentially confused,
and aided and abetted by inappropriate adversarial
21 5
decision-making.
Commentators have criticized the mens rea cases not only as poorly
reasoned and poorly crafted, but as "constitutional adjudication at its
205. Id. at 697-98.
206. Id. at 696.
207. E.g., Allen, The Restoration ofln Re Winship: A Comment on Burdens ofPersuasion
in Criminal Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 30, 34 (1977); Comment,
Unburdening the Criminal Defendant. Mullaney P. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, I I HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 390, 398 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process." The Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64
GEO. L.J. 871, 878-79 (1976).
208. Tushnet, ConstitutionalLimitation of Substantive CriminalLaw. An Examination of
the Meaning ofMullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U. L. REV. 775, 790-800 (1973).
209. Comment, supra note 207, at 424-30.
210. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
211. Id. at 214-15 n.15.

212. Id.
213.

Id. at 215.

214. Eg., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214-15 n.15 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 533 (1968); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463, 476 (1946).
215. The burden of proof cases, although not necessarily confused, did seem to demonstrate a particularly low level of awareness of the issues at stake. The Leland Court viewed
the issue as one merely involving a nonconstitutional burden issue. 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
Patterson, too, followed a formalistic approach. See, e.g., 432 U.S. at 215. In fact, however,
not only is a burden issue often decisive of the outcome, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525 (1958), but it is also an issue of substantive not merely procedural criminal law.
Tushnet, supra note 208, at 775-76. It is substantive because in deciding what factors must
be proved by whom, one necessarily raises questions of what constitutes the essence of a
crime that must be proved by the state. See notes 456-66 infra and accompanying text.
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worst. '' 2 16 Professor Packer has cogently demonstrated that the important
constitutional rules were reached without serious consideration by the
Court and as a result of extremely poor advocacy by lawyers representing
the victims of strict liability offenses. 2 17 Moreover, even the Morissette
opinion was confused about jurisprudential doctrine. It incorrectly
claimed mens rea had its roots in utilitarian philosophy rather than retribution, which it incorrectly equated with "retaliation and vengeance."' 2 8
Lambert, a remarkably short opinion, failed to explain how it could be
reconciled with the "no constitutional mens rea requirement" rule it repeated. 2 19 Moreover, in no mens rea case did either the Court or the parties realize that Weems's proportionality doctrine might be relevant. Only
220
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent in Lambert, even noted this possibility.
The defense cases were similarly jurisprudentially confused, weakly
crafted, and victims of unfortunate legal strategy. Fisher characterized the
issue at bar to be whether diminished capacity was a constitutionally mandated defense 22 1 when in fact, as the dissent realized, it involved no more
than the relevance of psychological evidence to negate the prima facie
mens rea of murder. 2 22 Robinson was a short and analytically unexplained
opinion, even though it was the first opinion to apply the eighth amendment as it did. It failed to cite Lambert as support for its result, nor did it
cite any prior eighth amendment case, even Weems. 223 Even Justice
Douglas's concurrence was confused, as he conceded that the acts of an
addict could be punished. 224 Yet he later analogized the insanity defense
to Robinson's predicament, thus ignoring the fact that the insanity defense
is triggered when a sick person acts out his antisocial thoughts. The viability of the Robinson doctrine was also perhaps affected by the choice of
Powell as the petitioner in the test case of Powell v. Texas. 225 Although he
was ably represented, 226 LeRoy Powell was the wrong defendant at the
wrong time because his case of compulsive drinking was weak and because, as a middle class alcoholic with a private place to be drunk, his
presence in public while drunk was voluntary. 227 With a more suitable
216. Packer, supra note 179, at 11. Packer criticizes the decisions as being "egregiously"
casual, id. at 113; "unsatisfying," id.; "flimsy," id. at 115; and "unilluminating," id. at 131.
See also Dubin, supra note 96, at 382-83,, for similar criticisms.
217. Packer, supra note 179, at 111-13, 128-29.
218. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
219. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 231.
221. 328 U.S. 463, 470 (1946). The Court referred to diminished capacity as the theory of
partial responsibility.
222. Id. at 492 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see Dubin, supra note 96, at 379.
223. Justice Douglas, however, cited a number of prior eighth amendment cases in his
concurrence. 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962).
224. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 674 (1962).
225. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
226. Merrill, Drunkenness and Reform of the CriminalLaw, 54 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1147

(1968).
227. See, e.g., Kaplan, Powell v. Texas: Alcoholics Anomalous, ChapterI or, Chronic Alcoholism and Criminal Responsibility, 5 CRiM. L. BULL. 191, 192 (1969); Kirbens, Chronic
Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 54 A.B.A.J. 877, 888 (1968); Merrill, supra
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petitioner, for example a skid row alcoholic, the Court could not as easily
have distinguished Robinson. The punishment of an obviously morally
blameless actor, rather than a status, would have been implicated. The
Court would perhaps have been compelled to overrule Robinson, or more
likely,2 28 apply Robinson in order to exculpate the alcoholic.
IV.

CRITICIZING RUMMEL

The Supreme Court expressly stated that Rummel's mandatory habitual
offender sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to Texas law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 229 It rejected as speculative Rummel's characterization of his crimes as petty. 230 Two of the three tests of
proportionality used by the petitioner, the seriousness of the offense and
the intrajurisdictional tests, were thus treated as too subjective for Court
use.2 3 ' The Court also discounted the third approach, interjurisdictional
analysis, as not inherently flawed, but too complex in this case, involving
only "subtle rather than gross" 232 distinctions. Rejecting any claim of
gross disproportionality based solely on this latter approach, the Court
noted that an interjurisdictional approach would violate traditional notions of federalism. 233 Generally, the Court in Rummel requires that
before a federal court will declare state criminal legislation to be in violation of the eighth amendment on proportionality grounds, sufficient objective criteria must exist by which evaluation of the claim can take place
without impinging on the paramount concepts of federalism and separation of powers.
So described, the Rummel opinion seems relatively unsurprising. In the
context of prior proportionality case law and other distributive justice
criminal law litigation, however, Rummel continues the unfortunate trend
in personhood litigation. Within this broader context, Rummel is a disappointing and potentially far-reaching decision. This section argues that the
note 226, at 1163-64; Note, Constitutional Law--Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Conviction
ofa Chronic Acoholic for Public Intoxication Not Violative of Eighth Amendment Proscription
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 337, 353, 355 (1968).
228. Powell was a five-to-four opinion. Justice White, one of the five Justices who voted
to affirm the conviction, concurred. He wrote:
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics,
Robinson v. California, . . . I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime
to yield to such a compulsion. . . . Distinguishing between the two crimes is
like forbidding criminal conviction for being sick with flu. . . but permitting
punishment for running a fever . . . . Unless Robinson is to be abandoned,
the use of narcotics by an addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law.

Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol
should not be punishable for drinking ....
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548-49 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Jus-

tice White might have been compelled to change his vote had Powell been a skid row alcoholic. Robinson would have thereby been extended somewhat and not limited to its facts.
229. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).

230. Id. at 275.
231. Id. at 282-83 n.27.
232. Id. at 279.

233. Id. at 281-82.
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opinion: (1) is poorly crafted; (2) demonstrates too little sensitivity to the
proportionality doctrine and too much deference to legislative wishes; (3)
is jurisprudentially confused; and (4) was affected by inappropriate legal
strategy.
A.

Craftsmanship

Rummel is so important to the future of entire classes of persons and to
societal institutions that "the reasons

. .

.[the Court gives for its] decision

are more important to the development of the law than the decision itself."' 234 The Court properly serves its legal and political function to interpret and apply constitutional doctrine when it writes opinions that
demonstrate the judicial process at its finest. Specifically, the Court's analysis and exposition should serve as a useful guide to the profession, to the
other institutions of government, and to the public; 2 35 it should explain
and justify the source of its reasoning; and it should write coherent, candid
opinions that generally adhere to precedent, except when injustice would
otherwise occur. 236 Unfortunately, the majority opinion
of Justice Rehn237
quist in Rummel P. Estelle fails on all of these counts.

1. Misinterpretation of Precedent. Writing for the majority in Rummel,

Justice Rehnquist gave his "without fear of contradiction" statement, and
stated that the length of sentences imposed for classified or classifiable
felonies is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. 238 He implied,
thereby, that Rummel was asking the Court to expand, rather than merely
to apply, the law of the eighth amendment. If this were true, Rummel
would be a less exceptional case. In fact, however, Justice Rehnquist is
less than candid in his interpretation of prior case law. Rummel is to
Weems's proportionality what Patterson was to Mullaney, Powell was to
239
Just
Robinson, and subsequent cases were to Lambert and Morissete.

as in those areas, in the area of proportionality the Supreme Court began
hesitantly, developed a proportionality doctrine, and then backed off in
Rummel under the claim of legislative prerogative. In Rummel, however,
the Court did more than simply recede from the logical implications of a
prior opinion or candidly narrow the holding of a past case. It put a false
appearance on precedent.
The holding of Weems is murky. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rum234. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 394 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). This conclusion
is not to demean in the slightest the severe impact of Rummel on the life of the petitioner.
235. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 13 (1969).
236. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921); Shapiro,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist. A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 329, 334, 349 (1976).
237. This criticism of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rummel is consistent with Professor
Shapiro's criticisms of early Rehnquist craftsmanship. See generaly Shapiro, note 236
supra.

238. 445 U.S. at 274; see text accompanying note 54 supra.
239. See text accompanying notes 172-228 supra and note 187 supra and accompanying
text.
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mel did not narrow the express holding of that decision. It did, however,
ignore the implied holding of the case, so that Rummel conflicts with the
common previous understanding of the Weems doctrine. 240 At the least,
Justice Rehnquist's "without fear of contradiction" comment could have
been more accurately written to read that "one could argue without fear of
contradiction by any decision of this Court that the eighth amendment
requires as a precept of justice that punishment be proportioned to the
severity of the offense, and that this precept has never been limited to nonlength-of-incarceration cases."
Justice Rehnquist limited Weems to its facts. 24 I He appears to have
claimed that the "bright line" of the "accessories" was a prerequisite to the
constitutional holding. The Weems Court was understandably shocked by
the accessories. That fact does not mean, however, that the Weems proportionality rule was not otherwise applicable. The Weems opinion often
noted both the length of Weems's imprisonment and the accessories, usually in conjunction, for while each aspect of the punishment was remarkable on its own, the totality of the mandatory sentence seemed particularly
Draconian. Weems was a revolutionary opinion since for the first time the
Supreme Court expanded the eighth amendment beyond common law
death penalty tortures. In addition, Weems was the first case to state the
existence of a proportionality principle. 242 In light of the existence of the
accessories as well as the "impressive" 24 3 length of imprisonment, to decide whether either factor standing alone was excessive would have been
unnecessary and probably inadvisable. The Court would have been guilty
244
of poor craftsmanship if it had done so.
Furthermore, much of the Weems opinion reasonably suggested that the
Weems Court did not focus as much on the accessory issue as Justice
Rehnquist claimed and that it would have declared the penalty disproportionate even without the accessories. First, the Court in Weems stated
"that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense." 21 45 Nowhere in the opinion did the
Court limit this broad precept of justice. In light of the revolutionary nature of its decision, one can reasonably expect that if the decision were
intended to be narrow-that the precept of justice was a limited one, or
that it would be limited in application-the Court would have either explicitly stated the limitation or at least suggested it.
Secondly, the error assigned by Weems himself was that "punishment of
fifteen years' imprisonment was a cruel and unusual punishment." 246 In
240. Although lower courts were originally hesitant to apply Weems, see note 171 supra,
modern courts did apply the rule to length of incarceration cases, see note 61 supra. Published commentaries also generally described Weems without expressly limiting it to its
mode of punishment. Eg., Wheeler, supra note 112, at 841.
241. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
242. See notes 156-57, 167-70 supra and accompanying text.
243. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 274.
244. Shapiro, supra note 236, at 328.
245. 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
246. Id. at 359.
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the petitioner's argument the accessory issue apparently was never
raised; 24 7 discussion centered entirely on the length of imprisonment.
Moreover, the Court twice quoted verbatim the petitioner's assignment of
error. 24 8 If the Court meant to limit judicial intervention to cases involving the unusual mode of accessory punishment, then one would not expect
the Court to have stated the issue in terms of the length of imprisonment.
Thirdly, the Weems Court cited McDonald P. Commonwealth ,249 a
Massachusetts case, which found a prison sentence grossly disproportionate. McDonald involved solely the length of imprisonment. The fact that
the Weems Court cited McDonald at a point in the opinion at which it was
attempting to buttress its eventual claim that the eighth amendment prohibits disproportionate punishment is circumstantial evidence of the
breadth of the Weems rule.
Fourthly, the Court cited its own Civil War decision of Pervearv. Commonwealth ,250 in which the Court in a dictum observed that a three-month
prison sentence and a fifty-dollar fine was not excessive in view of the
crime committed. 251 The Weems Court commented that Pervear was "[a]
decision from which no one will dissent. ' 252 What was the "decision"?
The decision was not a rejection of the excessiveness claim because it was a
mere length of imprisonment case. The decision, if a dictum can be so
characterized, was that the sentence was not excessive. If Weems, however, is as narrow an opinion as Justice Rehnquist suggests, the Weems
Court should have viewed the Pervear discussion of the excessiveness of
the sentence, even though a dictum, as inappropriate.
Fifthly, much of the language in Weems demonstrated deep concern for
the relationship between the crime and the number of years of imprisonment. The following language from Weems immediately preceded the
"accessory language" that Justice Rehnquist quoted in Rummel: 253
The law therefore allows a range from twelve years and a day to
twenty years. . . . The minimum term . . . is twelve years, and that,
therefore, must be imposed for "perverting the truth" in a single item
of a public record, though there be no one injured, though there be no
fraud or purpose of it, no gain or desire of it. Twenty years is the
maximum imprisonment, and that only can be imposed for the perversion of truth in every item of an officer's accounts . . . . Between
these two possible sentences, which seem to have no adaptable relation, or rather in the difference of eight years . . . the courts below
selected three years to add to the minimum of twelve years and a day
for the falsification of two items of expenditure amounting to the sums
247. Id. at 351-59.
248. Id. at 359, 362.
249. 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874 (1899).
250. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867).
251. Id. at 480. The crime charged was the keeping and maintaining, without a license,
of a tenement for the illegal sale and illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors.
252. 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910).
253. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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of 408 and 204 pesos. 254
The Court was balancing the harm caused (no injury and, at most, falsification of 612 pesos) and the blameworthiness of the actor (no fraud, no
gain or desire for it) versus the penalty of fifteen years. The excerpt also
demonstrates the Weems Court's concern that there was no legislative effort to graduate penalties between the twelve- and twenty-year extremes
for single and total falsification. This type of careful analysis is some evidence that the Court was seriously concerned with the length of imprisonment. Even Justice Rehnquist described the offense for which Weems was
convicted as "trivial, ' 25 5 a characterization he was unwilling to make in
Rummel's case, and the length of Weems's imprisonment as "impressive."' 256 If the offense was "trivial" and the sentence "impressive," it
seems reasonable to assert that if there is a precept of justice that punishment be graduated to the severity of crime, the Weems Court that first
enunciated this precept would have enforced it in that case on the basis of
length of imprisonment alone. The language quoted above from Weems is
most probably such an application. Finally, the dissent in Weems viewed
the holding in the broader sense when it said, "I yet cannot agree with the
conclusion reached in this case that because of the mere term of imprison'257
ment it is within the rule.
Weems, then, seems to be a broader holding than Justice Rehnquist acknowledged. This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that postWeems cases fail to support Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Weems.
Justice Rehnquist cited Badders v. United States,2 58 a decision rendered a
few years after Weems. Badders was convicted of seven counts of mail
fraud, each of which involved one letter, was sentenced to a total of five
years in prison, and was fined $1,000 per count. The Court in Badders
held that there was no violation of the eighth amendment. 259 It gave no
reason for its conclusion except to cite two previous cases, 260 neither of
which appears to have been an eighth amendment, much less a proportionality, case. From this shaky record Justice Rehnquist nonetheless concluded that Weems was narrowly decided. Three more plausible
explanations for Badders exist, however. First, as Rummel himself
pointed out, the Badders record gave no evidence that a claim of proportionality was ever raised. 26' Secondly, the issue before the Badders Court
was that of trying and sentencing a person on separate counts for what
may have been a single offense. Judicial, not legislative, action was involved. That this issue received the Court's focus is supported by the Bad254. 217 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1910).
255. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 274.
256. Id.
257. 217 U.S. 349, 411 (1910) (White, J.,
dissenting).
258. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
259. Id. at 394.
260. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
261. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 22 n.9; Reply Brief for the Petitioner in the
Supreme Court of the United States at 2 n.I, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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ders Court's citation to Ebeling P. Morgan ,262 which expressly raised such
a nonproportionality question. Finally, even if the Court had reached the
Weems issue, it no doubt would have concluded that five years' imprisonment and a fine of $7,000 was not disproportionate punishment in a case
involving mail fraud of seven letters. So interpreted, there is absolutely no
reason why the Badders Court should have cited Weems, since Weems.
would not have supported its conclusion. The absence of such a citation,
therefore, does not support Justice Rehnquist's conclusion.

The Court also used precedent improperly when it cited Graham v. West
Virginia26 3 to support its holding. First, the facts in Graham are not indis264
tinguishable from those in Rummel, as the Rummel opinion claims.

Graham committed two thefts and a burglary, not three thefts. Burglary is
a more serious offense than theft. 265 Also, Graham stole horses worth
$310, rather than the $229 in money stolen by Rummel. In light of inflation, Graham stole the equivalent of $1,287 in 1970 dollars or nearly six
times as much money as did Rummel. 266 Secondly, Graham was decided

before the eighth amendment was expressly made applicable to the
states. 267 Thirdly, Graham is a classically poorly crafted opinion, weak in

precedential value. Graham gives no reason, except to cite six pre-Weems
cases, 268 for its one sentence holding that cruel and unusual punishment

269
had not been inflicted. Four of the cases cited were nonrecidivist cases.
Three of the four expressly point to the fact that the eighth amendment

was inapplicable to the states. 270 One of the cases simply said in a dictum

that a sentence of ten years' imprisonment for felony conspiracy was not
an excessive sentence. 27 1 Of the two cases cited that involved habitual of262. 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
263. 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
264. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
265. Burglary at common law involved a breach against a person's habitation and not a
mere property loss. R. PERKINS, supra note 124, at 192. The public perceives burglary resulting in theft as a more serious offense than the theft itself. Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The
Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV.
224 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rossi]. In the Rossi study a burglary of a television set at a
home was the 68th most serious crime it tested, while a burglary of a store in which more
than one set was stolen was only 80th. Theft of an automobile was 78th, and other thefts
were ranked llIth, I15th, 117th, and 129th. Id. at 228-29.

266. U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES; COLO-

TIMES TO 1970 (PART I), H.R. Doc. No. 93-78, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Series E 135-166,
at 211 (1975) (using years 1907 and 1970 as the years for comparison).
267. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), was the first case to declare.a state
statute unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.
268. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204
U.S. 659 (1907); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180
U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890).
269. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204
U.S. 659 (1907); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890).
270. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204
U.S. 659 (1907); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
271. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903).
NIAL
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fender statutes, 27 2 one of them 273 stated no reason whatsoever for its conclusion that there was no violation of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. The remaining case, Moore v. Missouri,274 is a particularly murky
opinion of limited persuasiveness. 275 Moreover, it involved an habitual
offender law very different from that involved in Graham or Rummel. The
Moore statute required the sentencing authority to punish recidivists the
maximum punishment possible for a first time offender. In other words,
the law upheld in Moore did not require enhancement of punishment, but
only mandated nonleniency in punishment. Graham, then, without explanation, cited inappropriate cases. The Court in Rummel should not have
viewed Graham as a serious statement about any principle.
Furthermore, other Justices seemed to have understood Weems in the
broad sense. In Corey v. UnitedStates ,276 for example, Justice Stewart in a
footnote stated that the maximum possible sentence in that case, 375 years
in prison, "would obviously raise a serious issue under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. ' 277 This statement was in an opinion to which
eight Justices signed their names. Justice Frankfurter, a Justice not known
to favor judicial activism, may have also understood the eighth amendment to be applicable in length-of-incarceration cases. In Lambert v. California278 Justice Frankfurter hinted that the eighth amendment279could
constitute a possible objection to a person in Lambert's dilemma.
Finally, as the Rummel Court observed, many death penalty decisions
have repeated the Weems doctrine. 280 None, however, ever indicated that
the proportionality rule was limited to unusual mode-of-punishment cases.
Although the Court has stated the obvious-that the death penalty is
unique-no decision previously claimed that such uniqueness was a prerequisite to the judicial application of Weems's precept of justice.
272. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673
(1895).
273. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901).
274. 159 U.S. 673 (1895).
275. First, Moore expressly stated that the fourteenth amendment "was not designed to
interfere with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberty, or property of its citizens."
1d. at 678. Secondly, it cited lower court state cases to explain why recidivist laws did not
violate the double jeopardy clause. 1d. at 677. It then stated that, "It is quite impossible for
us to conclude that the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in holding that [the petitioner] was
not twice put in jeopardy for the same offence, or that the increase of his punishment...
was not cruel and unusual." id. Even assuming that the reasoning of the state courts was
intended as an eighth amendment justification, it is of limited value. One of the cases cited
expressly stated that, "punishment... out of all just proportion to the comparatively trivial
nature of the offense. . . .is a subject for the consideration of the Legislature and not of the
courts." People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 117 (1874). Even under the narrow interpretation of
Weems this statement is incorrect.
276. 375 U.S. 169 (1963).
277. Id. at 171 n.3.
278. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
279. "[A] cruelly disproportionate relation between what the law requires and the sanction for its disobedience may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment... . Id. at
231 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
280. See note 161 supra.
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The Court also misinterpreted the precedent of Coker v. Georgia28' as it
pertained to the requirement of objectivity in proportionality cases. The
Court in Coker sought guidance from the available objective evidence. It
stated that its "judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent. '282 The Court did not conclude, however, that
it should avoid judgment if objectivity was not entirely possible. In fact, it
stated that such factors cannot "wholly determine this controversy, for the
Constitution contemplates . . . our own judgment will be brought to bear
on" the eighth amendment issue. 283 Coker, then, in fact, called for exactly
the conclusion that Rummel offered in his brief.284 the limitation, not the
replacement, of subjectivity.
Precedent does not support the Rummel majority opinion. Weems declared a broad precept of justice that the judiciary was expected to enforce
and that various lower courts did enforce until the decision in Rummel was
handed down. 285 Rummel must be viewed as a step backward because it
erroneously or uncandidly interpreted precedent.

2. Distortion, Overkill, and Underkill. By distorting the facts and focusing on irrelevancies, the Court also misstated the issue in Rummel. For
example, 286 the majority opinion first noted Rummel's concession that his
crimes might properly be treated as felonies, and from that concession the
Court distorted the issue at hand. A "felony" in Texas, as the Court admitted, is an offense that "may-not must-be punishable by. . .confinement in the penitentiary. '287 That definition, however, makes absolutely
no reference to the length of such incarceration. The opinion nonetheless
proceeded later to define "felony" as a crime punishable by a "significant
[term] of imprisonment in a state penitentiary. ' 288 This definition serves
the purpose of changing Rummel's concession from an admission that
281. 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
282. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 597.
284. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 63.
285. See note 168 supra.
286. Two less important examples of distortion exist. The first is Justice Rehnquist's
treatment of murder by poison as nonviolent. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
Although the term "violence" applies to either a result or its means, it is often defined in the

former sense. E.g., Boecker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 281 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo. App. 1955)
("with reference to its effect on another"); Commonwealth v. Nadolny, 163 Pa. Super. 517,
63 A.2d 129, 130 (1949) ("to inflict harm or injury upon"). Death by poison is usually
viewed as a violent death. Watkins v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 165 F.2d 980, 982 (3d
Cir. 1948); Gahn v. Leary, 318 Mass. 425, 61 N.E.2d 844, 846 (1945). At the least, Justice
Rehnquist is guilty of ignoring the common understanding that murder is a violent crime.
Secondly, Justice Rehnquist treats drug crimes as property crimes in order to make them
indistinguishable from Rummel's crimes. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 282 n.27. Drug
crimes, however, are not generally treated in the same category as property crimes. See
Rossi, supra note 265, at 231; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (any year).
287. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 268 n.8 (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 47
(Vernon 1925)).
288. 445 U.S. at 274.
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Texas could have imprisoned him for each of the crimes to an admission
that he could be imprisoned for a substantial length of time. With this
manipulation, the Court made the issue at bar less dramatic: "the State's
authority to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, as opposed to a substantial term of years, for [Rummel's] third felony. ' 289 A bright line is less
likely when the issue is so misframed.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion also irrelevantly indicated that "Rummel
concededly could have received sentences totaling [twenty-five] years in
prison for what he refers to as his 'petty property offenses.' "290 The issue
in Rummel, of course, was not the propriety of amassing the sentences for
these three crimes; the issue was the validity of the punishment of life for
the third crime itself. This statement by Justice Rehnquist, however, despite its irrelevancy, served a purpose. It demeaned Rummel's claim that
his crimes were petty by implying that the amassing of three arguably
petty offenses thereby makes them individually nonpetty. It also further
distorted the focus of the case. By misstating the issue as "life . . .[versus]
a substantial term of years" 291 immediately after having totalled Rummel's
felony sentences to twenty-five years, Justice Rehnquist gave the false impression that the issue at stake was particularly minor: twenty-five years
292
versus life.
The Court also discussed an issue not before it. In light of Rummel's
concession regarding the feloniousness of his crimes the Court needed only
to decide the validity of punishing recidivist Rummel as Texas did. Nonetheless, Justice Rehnquist expressly and gratuitously stated that "Texas is
entitled to make its own judgment as to where [the line between felony and
misdemeaner larceny lies], subject only to those strictures of the Eighth
'293
Amendment that can be informed by objective factors.
On the other hand, the Court failed explicitly to reach an issue raised by
the case, briefed by the parties, 294 and logically necessary to the result: the
application of the alternative prong of Coker's excessiveness test, which
prohibits punishment that "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless
289. Id. at 270-7 1.

290. Id. at 269.
291. Id. at 271.
292. Even with the issue so framed, the issue was substantial. At one point the Court
treated as few as three, or perhaps two, years maximum imprisonment as significant terms.
See id. at 270 n.10, in which the Court listed "significant terms," including a sentence of
either a "fine or up to 3 years" imprisonment for North Dakota credit card theft. In id. at
269 n.9, the Court listed a punishment of "up to 2 years" in Louisiana for false pretenses. In
framing the issues, the Court used the word "substantial," not "significant," but both words
are synonymous for the adjectives "important" or "considerable." ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS § 672.16 (4th ed. 1977). Assuming the Court used the two words in this
fashion, the issue, then, in Rummel was a choice between "2 years or life;" hardly a close
case.
293. 445 U.S. at 284.
294. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 47-60; Brief for the Respondent in the

Supreme Court of the United States at 26-30, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief].
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and needless imposition of pain and suffering. '295 The opinion instead
296
treated directly only the proportionality claim.
3. UnclearandInconsistent Reasoning. Court opinions are rarely as clear
as analysts would wish. Rummel, however, as the following two examples
illustrate, is needlessly inconsistent and ambiguous. First, the opinion
spoke inconsistently and ambiguously regarding the role of the judiciary in
Rummel-type cases. On the one hand was the "without fear of contradiction" statement, suggesting that length of imprisonment in felony cases is
solely a matter of legislative discretion. 297 Although the majority opinion
did not say that such a proposition is correct, only that it is uncontradictable by stare decisis, nothing in the opinion suggested that the Court intended to diverge from this interpretation of precedent. Yet, the Court
expressly left open the question of the validity of imprisonment for life for
the crime of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. 298 Elsewhere, it quoted
approvingly Justice Frankfurter's view that "severity of punishment . . .
[is]peculiarly [a question] of legislative policy," 299 and observed that "any
'nationwide trend' toward lighter, discretionary sentences must find its
source and its sustaining force in the legislatures. ' '3°° On the other hand,
the Court hedged in its statement that the state may act "subject only to
those strictures of the Eighth Amendment that can be informed by objective factors."' 30 1 Although "there remains little in the way of objective
standards, '30 2 the Court did not expressly say that none exist. Rather,
the line in death penalty and Weems-type cases is only "considerably
clearer" 30 3 than in cases like Rummel. Recidivist cases are only "largely
within the discretion" 3° of the states. The ambiguity or inconsistency may
constitute a carefully intended decision by the Court to leave open the
possibility of a different result in some case not yet imagined by the Court,
295. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see note 377 infra. Coker separated the "excessiveness"

concept into two alternative considerations, that is, of gross disproportionality and the question of needless punishment. Coker did not reach the latter prong. 433 U.S. at 592 n.4. In a
dictum, however, it said "it would be difficult to support a claim that the death penalty for

rape is an indispensable part of the States' criminal justice system." Id. This prong has
never been the basis of a Supreme Court holding, although it was also briefly discussed by
Justice White in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 621 (1978), wherein he argued that the death
penalty for nonintentional killers violated the prong, largely because the punishment lacked
deterrent value. Id. at 625-26.

296. The Court's frequent utilitarian justifications for recidivist laws implicitly addressed
this issue. Nonetheless, as this prong of Coker has never been the subject of analysis in a
post-Coker majority opinion, the Court should have fulfilled its responsibility, see notes
234-37 supra and accompanying text, to expressly reach and explain its first-prong result.
297. 445 U.S. at 274; see text accompanying note 54 supra.
298. 445 U.S. at 276.
299. Id. at 282-83 n.27 (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 284.
301. Id.

302. Id. at 282-83 n.27 (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 275.

304. Id. at 285.
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or it may be the result of a compromise needed to obtain a fifth vote. In
either case the result is internal inconsistency and undesirable ambiguity.
Secondly, footnote 11305 of the majority opinion is an enigma. It stated
that proportionality "does come into play" in the "extreme example" of a
legislature making overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment. The Court failed to explain, however, why such a case requires judicial involvement in what is elsewhere viewed as largely or solely a
legislative matter. Does the Court mean that the proportionality "comes
into play" in order to invalidate the punishment, or only that a justiciable
issue exists? No answers are given. No rationale for the exception is
stated.
B.

Deference to the Legislature

1. Improper Court Deference. Rummel represents a dramatic change in
attitude regarding the significance of the "precept of justice that punish'30 6
ment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.
3
0
7
Rummel stands for the proposition that in a Rummel-type case either no
proportionality requirement exists, or although one exists, the Supreme
Court will not intervene to enforce it. Because of the poor craftsmanship
of the opinion, one cannot determine with certainty which interpretation
the Court intended. Although the judicial result is virtually the same either way in that Rummel loses, the societal implications are dramatically
different. If Rummel means that proportionality is not a requirement in
Rummel's case, then legislatures and sentencing authorities are not compelled by the Constitution to try to fashion a proportionate punishment. If
the Court intended only to defer to the Texas Legislature, then legislatures
must continue conscientiously to attempt to implement the still applicable
precept of justice.
Some of the opinion implies there is no proportionality doctrine in a
case such as Rummel. The Court's assurance that proportionality is required in death penalty and Weems-type cases 30 8 and that it "come[s] into
30 9
play" if a legislature sentences overtime parkers to life imprisonment
suggests that no proportionality rule comes into play in Rummel's case.
Moreover, the Court did not say that Rummel failed to prove by use of
objective criteria that his sentence violated the eighth amendment; it said
31 0 If
simply that the life sentence did not violate the eighth amendment.
the implication of Rummel is that proportionality is not required in such
cases, then the proportionality principle would have met the same fate as
in the mens rea situation: 3'1 it would be an important, but not constitu305. Id. at 274 n.11.
306. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
307. We leave full analysis of what is a "Rummel-type case" for later discussion. See
notes 407-49 infra and accompanying text.
308. 445 U.S. at 272.
309. Id. at 274 n. 11.
310. Id. at 285.
311. See notes 177-88 supra and accompanying text.
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tional concept, except sometimes.
Such an interpretation, although plausible, is very unlikely, for precepts
of justice are not normally limited to cases in which objective factors exist
to prove their violation. That the existence of objective criteria should be
required to trigger a precept of justice defies reason. Instead, the Court
probably meant only to suggest its unwillingness to intervene in Rummeltype cases to enforce the still present proportionality principle. Such an
interpretation is consistent with its expressed concern for federalism and
objectivity and its "reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment. ' 31 2 By his use of the "come into play" language, Justice
Rehnquist probably meant not "come into existence" but "be enforced."
So viewed, Rummel represents the common fate of other distributive justice concepts of the principle of proportionality: belated deference to the
legislature.
The deference in proportionality cases, however, is more substantial and
more detrimental to the principle of personhood than in other areas. Deference to the legislature in the mens rea area can be justified on the ground
that the doctrine is not viewed as a constitutional principle. 31 3 The same is
true with defenses. 31 4 In Rummel, however, the Court impliedly conceded
the existence of a constitutionally based principle of proportionality, but
deferred to the legislature with regard to its implementation. In Patter31 6
son, 3 15 in which the Court conceded a constitutional right was at stake,
that due process requires all prima facie elements to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Court's deference was nonetheless accompanied by
an expression of limitation upon legislative authority. In Rummel no limits were stated, 317 and no assurance was made that deliberate indifference
to the precept of justice or gross negligence in its application would constitute a basis for judicial reintervention.
This Article is not the forum to debate generally the wisdom of Court
abstention with regard to socially sensitive issues. Rather, the Court may
be criticized for its inconsistency. A double standard has developed
whereby the Supreme Court is far less prone to defer in matters of criminal
procedure than substantive criminal law without offering sufficient justification for the differential treatment. Rummel represents the apex of such
unequal judicial review.
Chief Justice Taft once indicted the criminal justice system as "a disgrace to our civilization. ' 31 8 Justice Frankfurter repeated the accusation
312. 445 U.S. at 274.
313. See note 174 supra.
314. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534-36 (1968); Fisher v. United States, 328
U.S. 463, 476-77 (1946).
315. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see text accompanying notes 210-13
supra.
316. 432 U.S. at 206.
317. Perhaps the Court's statement in footnote 11 establishes a limit. 445 U.S. at 274
n. 11. If so, this is a trivial limit, see notes 417-49 infra and accompanying text, and it would
have behooved the Court to explain it.
318. Taft, The Administration of CriminalLaw, 15 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1905).
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as recently as 1952. 19 Since then, however, the procedure of criminal justice has been revolutionarily changed, largely due to the initiative of the
Supreme Court. In matters of procedure the Burger Court is not an "apostle of judicial restraint. ' 320 Moreover, as Professor Ely has observed:
The current Court's constitutional jurisprudence is therefore not
content with limiting its intervention to disputes with respect to which
there exist special reasons for supposing elected officials cannot be
trusted . .

.

. Instead, it importantly involves the Court in the merits

of the policy or ethical judgment sought to be overturned, measuring
those merits against some set of "fundamental" value judgments. This
1
is not by any means an orientationoriginal to the Burger Court .32

As activist as the Supreme Court has been in areas of procedural reform,
substantive criminal law has barely changed. Inadequacies in common
law theory 32 2 have largely been left intact by legislatures, and legislatures
have undermined other aspects of the principle of personhood generally
protected at common law. 323 Meanwhile the Supreme Court, as demonstrated earlier, has largely deferred to such legislative indifference. Various rationales exist for this double standard. First, the Constitution
324
expressly speaks to matters of criminal procedure, but not substance.
The judicial role in the former is thus more obviously legitimate. Secondly, commentators claim that judges have expertise in matters of procedure, but substantive criminal law implicates issues of policy, a
traditionally legislative field in light of the countermajoritarian status of
the judiciary. 325 As an initial matter, the distinctions traditionally drawn
between procedure and substance are weak. The line between the two
parts of criminal law is largely symbolic. Much of "procedure" involves
"substance." The "procedural" question of burden of proof necessarily
implicates the substantive issue of what is a prima facie crime. 326 The
fourth amendment question of detention and questioning of citizens regarding crimes also impacts on the laws of attempt and the validity of
certain substantive criminal statutes. 327 No rigid line between the two areas is possible.
Even if one assumes that some meaningful line can be drawn between
matters of substance and procedure, however, the justifications offered for
319. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802 (1952).
320. Choper, The Burger Court. Misperceptions RegardingJudicialRestraint and Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV.767, 787 (1979).
321. Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term. Foreword- On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 15 (1978) (emphasis added).
322. See, e.g., note 140 supra.

323. See, e.g., note 174 supra. Strict liability criminal offenses are of recent legislative
vintage. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
324. E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.
325. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 144, at 1800-01. Goldberg and Dershowitz use

the term "countermajoritarian" to express the fact that the judiciary, as a nonelected institution, can frustrate public policies formed by the legislative body, which is thought to represent the wishes of the majority.
326. See note 215 supra and notes 456-66 infra and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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the application of different standards of judicial review are invalid. Nowhere does the Constitution speak of a fourth amendment exclusionary
rule. It was judicially created to enforce expressed rights. 328 Other rights
have been found outside the four comers of the Bill of Rights. 329 The fact
that the eighth amendment does not expressly enumerate specific punishments does not necessarily mean that it cannot be interpreted to protect
significant substantive rights of the criminally accused.
Furthermore, the line between procedure and substance is not one between judicial procedure and policy. The exclusionary rule, and fourth
amendment case law generally, represent judgments by the Court regarding competing policies of crime control and due process. 330 The privilege
against self-incrimination clearly represents a policy judgment in favor of
requiring the state to shoulder a greater load in its effort to prosecute a
suspect. Thus policy is involved with both substance and procedure.
Indeed, it may be more accurate to suggest that the line between procedure and substance is not one that distinguishes procedure from policy,
nor even that procedure and substance are both properly characterized
solely as matters of policy balancing, but that often the difference is between policy and principle. Most of criminal procedure involves the balancing of competing valid policies of crime control and due process. No
right answer exists. Decisions are a matter of judgment on a policy continuum. The Supreme Court has regularly conducted this policy balancing,
despite its countermajoritarian status. Substance, however, involves principles that limit policy decisions of legislatures. The question of what acts
should be punished is largely a policy decision involving competing questions of efficiency and morality. The substance of criminal law, however,
is also riddled with principles of a primary nature that must be established
before one asks and answers such questions of policy. Clearly, the issue of
distributive justice is a matter of principle. The principle of personhood is
not intended to be justifiable in the instrumentalist sense. 33' Rather, it answers the moral question of whether a society can punish the innocent or
disproportionately punish the guilty. This principle of personhood serves
328. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
329. The right to privacy is one example. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
330. For a discussion of the policies, see H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 149-73.
331. "Instrumentalism" is used to mean that criminal law punishment, or any other rule,
is invoked in order to further some future goal, not simply because it is intrinsically right or
moral to do so. So understood, it is roughly synonymous in this context with utilitarianism,
without incorporating the specific goals of utilitarianism.
The instrumentalist theory rejects the importance of criminal law as a separate discipline and locates the criminal sanction within a matrix of devices
designed to further the all-encompassin& goal of social protection. The instrumentalist maintains that there is no intrinsic difference between criminal punishment and civil commitment; they both function to further the same goal of
confining dangerous persons. As a result, the critical inquiry is whether particular rules are compatible with this ultimate goal. . . . [T]he facts of the
individual case are less important than projections about the impact of punishment on the accused and on other persons who might be deterred.
Fletcher, supra note 110, at 302.
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as a limit on application of instrumentalist policies by the legislature. 332
The application of established principle involves no balancing. The crucial question is whether the legislature or the judiciary should have the
final word regarding the meaning and content of such principles. Given
that the legislature will have the initial role, should the judiciary retain
oversight of legislative actions that arguably impinge on the principle of
personhood?
The answer to this question depends on which body is more likely accurately to find and enforce such values and on the implications of any error
in its resolution. 333 Certainly the task of finding precepts of justice is not
foreign to the Supreme Court. Despite objections by various Justices to
conducting such an exercise, 334 the Court, through some of its least activist
Justices, has regularly done so. 335 Furthermore, "justice" does not seem to
be a subject always outside judicial competence. Instead, the late Professor Bickel has noted four factors that together result in the Court's "lack of
capacity" to adjudicate matters of justice:
(a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance
judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be; (d)
finally, . . . the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution
which 36is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength
3

from.

No one can seriously argue that any but perhaps the last factor is involved
in proportionality cases. Yet, "electoral irresponsibility" is a strength, not
a weakness, of the judiciary, because the issue to be adjudicated in proportionality cases is not one of political representation 337 but the moral, nonutilitarian question of distributive justice. The judiciary should be more,
not less, able dispassionately to measure society's moral winds than a legis338
lature buffeted by vocal, and often unrepresentative, minority groups.
The risks from court abdication are great. An error by the judiciary in
favor of a defendant and against legislative action adds to the right of individuals while denying legislative flexibility. This error seems preferable to
the alternative: leaving the enforcement of the principle of personhood to
the good faith and abilities of legislative bodies. The violation of individual rights that would result from a legislative error in the application of
that precept of justice is more serious than any loss of legislative flexibility
332. See generally Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards.Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). See also Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility
in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
333. Maltz, Judicial Competence and Fundamental Rights, 78 MICH. L. REV. 284, 285

(1979).
334. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
335. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.).
336. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962).

337. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962).
338. Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689, 716-17 (1976); Wellington, supra note
332. at 266-67.
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that would be sacrificed by allowing judicial oversight. 339
The conflicting trends of procedural activism and substantive deference
are not explainable in any consistent, principled fashion. One can only
suspect the real, unprincipled reasons for the double standard: (1) a lack
of sensitivity by the Court to the paramount importance of the principle of
personhood; (2) a fear of substantive criminal law because it raises difficult
philosophical questions; (3) a lack of interest by the Court in the less exciting issues of "general justifying aims" and "distributive justice" as compared to the more appealing questions of warrantless searches and
seizures; and (4) the fact that legal education trains its future judges in
instrumentalist thinking, and does not "contaminate" them with moral
340
philosophy.
Certainly none of these reasons justifies deference. The issues of substantive criminal law are too important to merit such an attitude. Although the Court may wish to avoid slippery slopes, even the dissent in the
original circuit court opinion in Rummel cautioned against judicial abdication. 34 1 Yet abdicate is exactly what the Rummel Court did. To suggest
that the eighth amendment of the Bill of Rights incorporates a precept of
justice that the states may not violate, but leaves its application in Rummel-type cases to the states themselves is ludicrous. 342 The eighth amendment calls for decency by the state in its treatment of its citizens. The
inclusion of this basic moral principle within the Constitution creates a
judicial responsibility to oversee its enforcement. Although this responsibility involves the "fusion of constitutional law and moral theory," 343 passivity is no more justifiable here than in the other interdisciplinary areas in
which the legal community belatedly has become involved. 344
The attorney general of Texas called on the Court to display judicial
restraint because the case for judicial involvement was "so attractive. ' 345
He claimed that Texas was entitled to treat Rummel differently than were
339. This view is not one possessed by Justice Rehnquist. In Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 468 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), he speaks about the implications of judicial
versus legislative error:
[A]n error in mistakenly sustaining the constitutionality of [a death penalty
statute], while wrongfully depriving the individual of a right secured to him by
the Constitution [herein, life], nonetheless does so by simply letting stand a
duly enacted law of a democratically chosen legislative body. The error resulting from a mistaken upholding of an individual's constitutional claim...
is a good deal more serious. . . . [It imposes] upon the Nation the judicial fiat
of a majority of a court of judges whose connection with the popular will is
remote at best.
340. Wellington, supra note 332, at 225-27; see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977).

341. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1202 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thomberry, J., dissenting),
afl'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
342. L. TRIBE, supra note 96, § 8.7, at 452.
343. R. DWORKIN, supra note 340, at 149.
344. Ely, supra note 321, at 36-37, whimsically denigrates the idea of courts' following
the philosophers of the New York Review ofBooks. The advantage of the fusion of constitutional law and moral theory, however, is that the Court will thereby have a coherent philosophy, one capable of being understood and criticized on principled grounds.
345. Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 30.
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other states "in light of unique Texas experience. ' 346 The attorney general
never stated what that experience was, and he conceded that Texas did not
know what to do with recidivists such as Rummel. 347 That a state would
nonetheless ask for freedom to act outside the purview of judicial oversight
is disquieting at the least. 34 8 Even more disturbing is the Court's consent
to the request. Rummel is subject to legitimate criticism, not simply because the Court allowed Texas to punish Rummel as it did, but because it
suggested that Texas may do so largely without judicial supervision.
2. Subjective Versus Objective Oversight. Court supervision of the constitutional right of proportionate punishment is not a call for subjective evaluation. Nonetheless, without endorsing subjectivity, the Court's concerns
should be put in proper perspective. The line between subjectivity and
objectivity is not, and never has been, as bright as Justice Rehnquist would
like it to be or suggests it has been.
First, although objectivity is no doubt a preferable approach to judicial
analysis because of the seeming illegitimacy of a countermajoritarian institution applying its own values, subjectivity will not necessarily result in
different conclusions than objectivity. "Judges . . . are warmed and
cooled
by the same winter and summer and by the same ideas as a layman
is."'3 4 9 Contending that judicial evaluation of a crime's seriousness is likely
to be similar to general societal evaluations of most crimes as measured by
350
legislative bodies is not implausible.
Secondly, although subjectivity is not a popular value to endorse, and
although the Supreme Court has always denied it has acted other than
neutrally, the finding and enforcing of fundamental rights inevitably in346. Id. at 21.
347. Id. at 26.
348. There is a hint of laziness in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. It speaks at various times
of the "complexities" confronting the Court in the case. See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text. It almost appears as if the Court believes deference is appropriate merely
because Rummel asked the Court to work hard. This may be why Justice Powell, in dissent,
accused the majority of choosing "the easiest line rather than the best." 445 U.S. at 307.
The difference between the requirement of "bright lines" and avoidance of difficult adjudication is not always easy to ascertain.
349. J. POWELL, THE LOGIC AND RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918), quotedin
C. MILLER, supra note 235, at 32.

350. This queston is essentially unstudied, but vital. One study might suggest a contradictory conclusion. In Erickson & Gibbs, On The PerceivedSeverity ofLegal Penalties, 70 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 102 (1979), the authors found that police officers perceive the severity of
punishment differently than do private citizens. Generally, the former perceive prison
sentences more severely than jail terms, probation, or fines. This distinction raises fascinating questions regardin proportionality analysis. Theoretically, a police officer would be
more likely to find a given prison sentence disproportional to a given crime than would a
civilian, because the former views the sentence as more severe. The authors do not offer a
particular reason for the differential attitude, but a logical inference is that the judiciary
might perceive severity of prison sentences differently than the general citizenry. This conclusion does not suggest, however, that evaluation of the moral seriousness of a crime, the
other side of the formula, would differ. The author of this Article is currently conducting a
law student evaluation of the seriousness of specific crimes, to be published in the near
future, that may shed light on this question.
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cludes a subjective component. 35' Protecting fundamental rights allows no
alternative. Justice Felix Frankfurter spoke of the approach to finding "ultimate decency in a civilized society" 352 as a scientific one, 353 but realism
tells us it is not. 35 4 As noted earlier, 355 Coker was not the clarion of objectivity that Justice Rehnquist claimed it to be. Even if subjectivity is considered less undesirable in death penalty cases, the difference is one of
degree, not kind.
Finally, application of the usual objective criteria of public sentiment,
such as legislative enactments, jury deliberations, and public opinion
polIs, 3 56 although nicely quantifiable, runs the risk of legitimizing less rational and more prejudiced judgments than application of less quantifiable
and therefore so-called subjective values. Social science literature demonstrates that the public at times evaluates the seriousness of crime ininexplicable fashion. 357 Opinions in a democracy need not be tangibly
rational, but they should not be entitled to legal ratification when they are
based on prejudice, false information, or no reason at all. 358 The inappropriateness of such ratification is particularly apparent when the effect of
such acceptance is the deprivation of the liberty of another. Blind adherence to objective criteria, in order to avoid the evils of subjectivity, is more
dangerous than judicial deference to the legislature itself.
The Supreme Court should not have deferred to the legislature because
of the alleged lack of objective tools to evaluate Rummel's claim. It
should have reviewed Rummel's case, recognizing the Court's countermajoritarian role, presuming the legitimacy of the legislative action, and
being careful not to act in a "pigheaded" fashion. 3 59 It should have ana351. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due ProcessAdjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 325 (1957).
352. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

353. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
354. Justice Cardozo observed that the social interest of precedent must be balanced by
the judge against the "social interest served by ...fairness." B. CARDOZO, supra note 236,
at 113. "If you ask how he is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only

answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and
study and reflection; in brief, from life itself." ld. But, Justice Cardozo also concedes that:

[E]very one of us has in truth an underlying philosophy of life. .
in each of us a stream of tendency

.

.

.

.There is

.which gives coherence and direction

to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more than other
mortals. All their lives, forces which they do not recognize . ..have been
tugging at them - inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions;
and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs ...

which, when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall
fall.
Id. at 12. A judge's finding of "ultimate decency in a civilized society," therefore, cannot be
fully answered outside the context of the judge's own perspective on life.
355. See notes 281-84 supra and accompanying text.
356. Eg., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 180-82 (1976).

357. Rossi, supra note 265. In the Rossi study, sale of heroin was viewed as more serious
than the assassination of a public officer, and use of heroin was worse than forceable rape of
a former spouse. Id. at 228. Although reasons can be given for such findings, they are at
least plausibly the result of inappropriate considerations.
358. R. DWORKIN, supra note 340, at 248-53.
359. L. TRIBE, supra note 96, § 8.7, at 455.
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lyzed all of the information available, given primary emphasis to the objective material, but searched its own collective heart for resolution of the
ethical question. The Court in Coker took this approach. Rummel asked
for the same consideration, but the Court refused. On the issue of judicial
review, the dissent in Coker became the slim majority in Rummel, without
suitable justification for, or even admission of, the change of attitude.
C. JurisprudentialConfusion
1. Correct ProportionalityAnalysis. Weems and its progeny call for an
end to grossly disproportionate punishment. The Rummel Court should
not have deferred to the legislature on the application of this doctrine. In
order to explain how the Court should have decided the case and to
demonstrate the Court's confusion of the jurisprudential doctrines it did
confront, one must consider more fully the correct meaning of "proportionality." This consideration is only possible within the context
of the
360
nonutilitarian personhood principle construct developed earlier.
Punishment proportionate to a crime should match the relative degree of
culpability and risk of harm represented by each offense. "'Gravity'
roughly equals the malevolently intended harm done."' 361 The difficulty is
deciding what is the relationship of act to actor, or of the harm caused or
threatened to the blameworthiness of the actor. As utilitarian values stress
the harm, so too, retributive values focus initially on the act. Blame is
initially based on the act.362 Evil thoughts are not blameworthy in the
retributive system. The harm, either caused or threatened by the act, is the
trigger for blame.
Because the principle of personhood requires that we treat the antisocial
actor presumptively as a person capable of choice, we initially assume that
the antisocial actor was fully accountable or culpable for his acts. 363 In
short, the maximum punishment for a crime is fixed by the degree of seriousness of the harm caused or threatened. To the extent that the actor is
not fully culpable, however, the punishment must be reduced. 364 To do
otherwise is to lack compassion for personal distinctions, to blame persons
collectively not individually. A natural assumption of the principle of personhood is that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
his acts. If the person has a less blameworthy mens rea, however, the person's culpability is reduced. For example, to the extent that the actor's
conduct was less a matter of choice than it was due to intrinsic factors
beyond his control, his blame is also less, and the punishment must again
be reduced.
What is significant from this structure is that because punishment can360. See notes 96-152 supra and accompanying text. The following textual discussion is

a statement of what a legislature or common law should do, not necessarily what it has
always done.
361. van den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 123, 125 (1978).
362. R. SINGER, supra note 143, at 17.
363. G. FLETCHER, supra note 120, § 6.6.2, at 461; H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 140.
364. G. FLETCHER, supra note 120, § 6.6.2.
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not exceed the gravity of the harm, personal culpability cannot aggravate
such punishment. Deciding what factors are relevant to punishment and
whether they are harm or culpability oriented is consequently necessary.
"Harm" causes the societal disequilibrium that fixes the highest punishment. The statute defining the crime denotes the nature of the harm that
therefore sets the penalty. The harm may be the killing of a human being,
the taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, the
forceable sexual intercourse of a man with a woman not his wife, or an
attempt of such actions.
More difficult is calibration of this harm. The harm that the act in fact
causes to the victim and society is relevant to such calculation. Such harm
may be physical, psychological, or moral. There is also a harm to society
in conduct that nearly causes additional harm. The crime of "attempt" is
thus retributively punishable because it results in societal apprehension
and a partial tear of societal fabric. 36 5 Even with consummated harm, additional harm not caused or even "attempted" in a legal sense but which is
risked by the actor's behavior may be relevant to the computation of the
amount of harm involved. Rape always causes physical contact. Rape
also creates a serious risk of psychological or bodily injury. The rapist
may fairly be blamed not only for what he in fact did, but for what was
foreseeably risked. On the other hand, it is unfair to punish the actor for
these risks as severely as if they had materialized. To treat the risked harm
and the consummated harm identically is to ignore the different levels of
harm committed.
Such calculations of harm have limits. Virtually all acts carry some remote additional risks. When such risks appear bizarre, or too unforeseeable to be considered normal risks of the defined crime, they cannot fairly
be treated as a part of the harm that sets the maximum punishment, because the consummation of the risks would be more imputable to factors
other than the actor.3 66 Nor should the "harm" include harm caused by
other people who commit the same crime. Drug sales, when committed
often by many different people may reasonably risk substantial societal
damage. The actor in court, however, is the one on trial, and not drug
dealers generally; his act is the one to be punished. To punish the drug
seller for the harm that drug pushers generally may cause is to punish on
utilitarian grounds and to distribute punishment aggregately, not personally.

367

365. Id. § 3.3.2, at 144.
366. This conclusion is consistent with traditional theories of proximate or legal causation in criminal and tort law. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 124, at 690-738.
367. This jurisprudential concept is often misunderstood, particularly in the realm of
drug trafficking. At times courts have expressly treated the potential collateral crimes that
flow from drug sales as relevant harm. E.g., State v. Mallery, 364 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (La.
1978); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 117, 332 N.E.2d 338, 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 481
(1975). One post-Rummel court, however, has explicitly rejected this faulty analysis. In
Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit noted that although the legislature may set a penalty based on the "danger posed by the normal range of
proscribed conduct," id. at 1370 (emphasis added), punishment of any individual actor must
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Most significantly to Rummel's case, however, "harm" cannot include
harm previously caused by an actor, or harm that he may cause later. Retribution looks backward at the harm caused, and not at future dangerousness, nor at prior crimes for which the actor has already been punished
and thereby returned to moral equilibrium. To include previously committed crimes or evidence of general dangerousness within the assessment
of harm is to punish more than the current amount of societal disequilibrium. The now innocent part of the actor would be punished.
The factors pertaining to blameworthiness or culpability are more easily
stated. One looks only at factors that indicate the actor is not fully accountable for the harm: (a) he did not cause it; (b) he committed it unintentionally; or (c) he suffered from some internal condition that rendered
his action less blameworthy. The person's general character is irrelevant.
Poor character may evoke a utilitarian concern of dangerousness. It may
make us like or respect the actor less. It does not, however, justify a more
severe punishment. Good character, as well, may make us like the actor
more. We may want to show him mercy because of such positive attributes. We may, therefore, demonstrate such leniency by punishing him less
than justly required, but just punishment is punishment based on the act
and not the character. Character is not a mitigating circumstance and
punishment is not mitigatable based on character assessment. Lesser punishment may only be defended on grounds of mercy, not justice. 368 The
relevant mitigating characteristics are those internal factors that make a
specific criminal act less blameworthy.
Analysis of the habitual offender flows easily from this philosophical
construct. Punishment of the recidivist must be justified by nonutilitarian
principles. Within the retributive context the habitual offender commits
no greater harm as a result of his status as a recidivist. His persistence, at
most, tells us something negative about his character-that he is unable to
resist committing crime 369-but this propensity cannot be the basis for aggravating his punishment. The harm caused by a recidivist's crime is no
greater than that of a first offender, so aggravation beyond the maximum
sentence set for that crime is retributively unjustified. Society is not
harmed by his defiant character. It is harmed by the crimes committed. A
recidivist statute that permits punishment in excess of the maximum permissible for the last committed crime, assuming that the punishment set
for the last committed crime was as high as permissible under the proportionality doctrine, thereby authorizes disproportionate punishment.
Critics may argue that the principle of personhood so interpreted leaves
a society helpless to deal with crime, and it frustrates a legal system that
has as its general justifying aim a utilitarian desire to prevent crime. No
be proportional to his caused harm. "[W]e cannot sweep into our analysis the harm posed
by the conduct of others." Id. The alternative approach "necessarily eliminate[s] the proportionality principle as applied to individual cases." Id.
368. See note 114 supra.
369. This persistence, however, may tend to prove the opposite; that is, a legally cognizable psychological infirmity that would serve to mitigate punishment.
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easy, or necessarily satisfying, answer to this concern exists. The principle
of personhood does undercut utilitarian goals, a price we pay for a generally libertarian, nontotalitarian state. The criticism, however, is overstated. First, the principle of personhood hardly leaves a society helpless.
It may result in some cases of punishment that are not maximally efficient
for utilitarian purposes, but proportionate punishment still should have a
substantial deterrent impact. The harm of serious crimes is sufficiently
great that the proportionate punishment is still severe. 370 Secondly, current scientific literature supports the claim that in many cases certainty and
celerity, not amount, of punishment is most effective under the utilitarian
approach. 37' Thirdly, the better way to deter crime is to ameliorate its
causes, not punish its effects. The principle of personhood can serve as an
incentive to refocus the efforts to prevent crime. Fourthly, within the legal
context of this society, although the precept of justice is that punishment
be proportionate, case law interpretation of the eighth amendment has
only invalidated punishment that is grossly disproportionate. Intentionally or unintentionally, properly or improperly, 372 this standard gives the
society some utilitarian leeway. Fifthly, the principle of personhood does
not necessarily prevent the treatment of recidivists differently from firsttime offenders. Although aggravated punishment of recidivists violates the
personhood principle, old habitual offender laws, such as that involved in
Moore,373 wherein recidivists are mandatorily punished the maximum
permitted for a single crime, would not violate the principle on its face,
because such punishment does not exceed the amount deserved for the
harm caused.
2. Correct Analysis of Term "Gross." The eighth amendment has been
interpreted to punish grossly disproportionate punishment, not merely disproportionate punishment. Weems, however, did not use the term "gross."
The precept of justice set forth in Weems required merely that punishment
be proportionate. The term "gross" was apparently first used in a dictum
in Gregg v. Georgia374 and has been restated since. 375 The Supreme Court
has not explained the addition or defined the term, nor have commentators
given it scholarly attention. Correct analysis of a proportionality case,
370. The author's approach is consistent with prior judicial policy in Great Britain, according to Glanville Williams. Williams, The CourtsandPersistent Offenders, 1963 CRIM. L.
REV. 730, 733. Williams believed, as well, that most maximum sentences in that country
made the enhancement of recidivist laws unnecessary for utilitarian reasons. Id. at 738.
371. J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 49-65 (1974); F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 194-203 (1973); California Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure, Progress Report, Deterrent Effects of Criminal Sanctions 25 (May 1968), quotedin S.
KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 23 (1975).
372. See notes 374-82 infra and accompanying text.
373. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895).
374. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
375. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 n.7 (1976).
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therefore, requires an understanding of this judicial gloss on the precept of
justice.
Working from a clean slate, the term "gross" could have three meanings.
First, it could mean "substantially greater" in a quantitative sense. Thus,
if a decision is made that proportionate punishment for crime X is Y years
in prison, then Y plus one year in prison might be disproportionate while
Y plus five years would be grossly disproportionate.
Secondly, "gross" could more narrowly mean "obvious" or "immediately apparent." The first interpretation requires a two-step analysis: deciding how many years of punishment is proportionate, and then deciding
whether the punishment, if disproportionate, is greatly so. The second interpretation requires only one step: punishment would not be unconstitutional unless the disproportionality is immediately apparent without
sophisticated analysis. A punishment grossly disproportionate under this
test would clearly violate the former interpretation, but the opposite is not
necessarily true. Proportionate punishment for theft might be twenty
years. Thirty-five years might be greatly disproportionate, but that fact
may not be obvious unless one conducts a careful inter- and intrajurisdictional analysis. If the death penalty were mandated for theft, however, the
punishment would be obviously disproportionate without further analysis.
Punishment grossly disproportionate under this interpretation would be
punishment that "shocks the conscience" and requires no further elaboration.
The third and most dramatic interpretation of "gross" is one that permits utilitarian factors to be considered. The Court could intend the use of
the term to permit greater punishment than is retributively proportionate
to the extent that the punishing jurisdiction can offer good utilitarian reasons for so doing. This interpretation would be attractive to those who are
unnecessarily concerned that proportionality severely limits the state's
ability to combat crime.376 According to this view, a defendant would be
required to demonstrate that the punishment was disproportionate, and
the burden could then shift to the state to offer utilitarian justifications for
its greater punishment.
This third interpretation of "gross," however, is inappropriate on
grounds of precedent, principle, and practicality. First, such an understanding conflicts with a reasonable interpretation of Coker and its two
alternative tests of excessiveness, 377 because this interpretation of "gross"
renders the two prongs duplicative. Therefore, one prong will always be
sufficient to adjudge the matter of excessiveness. In a jurisdiction in which
retribution is the general justifying aim of the criminal law, any punishment grossly in excess of what is retributively required, and thus in viola376. See notes 370-72 supra and accompanying text.
377. The two-prong test of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), is that "a punishment
is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id.
at 592; see note 295 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of the proportionality prong, would also automatically violate the
other prong because such punishment would make "no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" in a jurisdiction in which the
acceptable goal of punishment is retribution. Likewise, in a jurisdiction in
which a general justifying aim of the criminal law is utilitarian in nature,
the duality of tests is again unnecessary. Under this interpretation of the
term "gross,". "grossly disproportionate punishment" means "disproportionate punishment unjustified by the general justifying aim of the utilitarian system." This interpretation means that the excess punishment,
punishment above the proportionality line, serves no measurable utilitarian purpose. Grossly disproportionate punishment will thus always violate the other prong. If the alternative prongs are each to have
independent value, "gross" must be understood in a nonutilitarian fashion.
This interpretation also conflicts with the holding of Weems. If retributively excessive punishment is not grossly disproportionate because of the
fact that it is justified on a utilitarian basis, the proponents of this approach
claim thereby that disproportionate punishment can be just punishment.
Weems, however, held that a precept of justice is that punishment be proportionate, not that it "not be grossly disproportiona[te]." Although an
argument can be made that personally unjust punishment is societally
just, 37 8 this conclusion cannot be derived from the lesson of Weems.
Secondly, such an interpretation of the term "gross" is nonprincipled. If
excessive punishment is not justifiable as a matter of precedent, an argument could be made that it is excusable when it is predicated on utilitarian
factors. A defense of this interpretation of "gross" would run similar to the
views expressed by Bickel in another context: "No good society can be
unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden. '379 Such a
concern is overstated in this context. 380 More relevantly, such an interpretation of "gross" combines principle with instrumentalist policy. Like
water and oil, policy and principle do not mix well. Under this interpretation of the term "gross," the principle of personhood is limited by utilitarian policy. The tail wags the dog. The proportionality concept becomes
valid only to the extent that it does not conflict with utilitarian goals. In
effect, the proportionality principle becomes an instrumentalist-based concept.
Finally, such an interpretation also raises practical problems unrelated
to questions of principle. Under this view, the state would have to justify
the disproportionality on utilitarian grounds. Courts would be required to
intrude into legislative policy, exactly the area from which they now shy,
and such an intrusion would involve issues of greater complexity than the
evaluation of proportionality as a conventional morality.
"Gross," therefore, should not be interpreted to mean "unjustified by
378. See note 147 supra.

379. A. BICKEL, supra note 336, at 64.
380. See text accompanying notes 370-72 supra.
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notions of utilitarianism."'38 l The term has been grafted onto the eighth
amendment principle of proportionality presumably not because disproportionality is just while gross disproportionality is unjust, but because the
Court concedes that reasonable minds can differ as to where proportionality ends and disproportionality begins. Because of the presumptive constitutionality of legislative action and the Court's desire to be deferential, it
must have intended "gross" to suggest that punishment is not unconstitutional until the punishment differs from the appropriate amount so sufficiently that the Court can feel reasonably satisfied that the legislature was
wrong in its action and that the judiciary is correct. 382 The precept of justice requires proportionality, but deference requires substantial disproportionality before the Court will feel satisfied that the precept was violated.
In light of the foregoing discussion, "gross" is a misnomer. A preferable
approach would have been for the Supreme Court to have adhered to the
Weems language and to have held that the eighth amendment condemns
all disproportionate punishment, but that a defendant must meet a heavy
burden to prove that the precept was violated.
3.

Errorsin Rummel.
a. JurisprudentialAnalysis. Rummel is riddled with jurisprudential
error. Although the majority opinion in Coker was generally a jurisprudentially solid opinion, 383 Justices Rehnquist and Burger in dissent
demonstrated substantial error. 384 Rummel is Coker's dissent memorial381. The choice of which of the first two meanings of "gross" is appropriate is not a
matter of philosophical import. The second meaning, however, is in one respect more consistent with concepts of deference as it will less often involve analysis of legislation. It also is
consistent with the attitude of laziness demonstrated by this Court. See note 348 supra. On
the other hand, this test can result in more subjective, intuitive analysis. See notes 448-49
infra and accompanying text.
382. This view is consistent with the proportionality doctrine as first conceived, although
not born, in the dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting):
The eighth amendment prohibits "all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Id at 339-40 (emphasis added). It
also seems consistent with McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874 (1899),
quoted n Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1909) ("so disproportionate... as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment").
383. The Coker opinion properly analyzed the seriousness of rape. It included as harm
the moral injury to the victim, as well as those injuries that "normally" and "very often"
occur. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977). It also was sensitive to the importance of judging the seriousness of rape from its statutory definition and not from hypothetical possibilities. Id. at 598. Most significantly, it excluded utilitarian factors from its
analysis. Id. at 599.
384. The dissent's most notable error was its failure to separate proportionality analysis
from utilitarian values. In numerous places it justified the constitutionality of Coker's penalty on utilitarian grounds. 433 U.S, at 608-10, 617-18. The dissent also demonstrated unsound proportionality analysis when it claimed that proportional punishment of a thief
would require only that the thief return the money. Id. at 619 n.16. Proportional punishment, however, is punishment symbolically equal to the harm caused by the crime. Symbolically proportional punishment of a thief would include the harm to the victim, including his
lost use, and harm to society. The dissent's analysis ignored this.
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ized as a majority opinion. The error now becomes the collective blame of
the Court.
Most basically, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rummel demonstrates a
utilitarian approach to proportionality. He rejected Rummel's characterization of his crime as petty because of its nonviolence, partly because "absence of violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest in
deterring a particular crime. '385 He also accepted the validity of enhanced
punishment of recidivists because of the state's interest in punishing more
severely those "incapable of conforming to the norms of society. '386 The
opinion demonstrates a total lack 387
of awareness of the distinction between
retributive and utilitarian factors.
Justice Rehnquist also failed to understand the aggravating/mitigating
features of proportionality. He suggested that only a subjective line can be
drawn between the attempted defrauder and the successful one. The former is "no less blameworthy, only less skillful. ' 388 This conclusion is true
and has been offered as a frequent scholarly criticism of the tradition of
punishing attempts less seriously than completed crimes. Such criticism,
however, is largely premised on utilitarian grounds. 389 Such differential
390
punishment is generally accepted as justifiable on retributive grounds.
As the proportionality doctrine is retributively based, reduced punishment
for attempt is analytically justifiable. As noted earlier, when the harm is
less, punishment must be less;39 1risked harm, although punishable, is less
serious than completed harm.
385. 445 U.S. at 275.
386. Id. at 276.
387. Even Justice Powell's dissent was somewhat in error. Although his opinion alone
noted the importance of distinguishing between retributivism and utilitarianism, he viewed
utilitarianism as a proper, albeit limited, factor, and agreed that Rummel's recidivism was
properly considered. Id. at 301. He also seemed to contend that utilitarian justification by
Texas would save the statute from a disproportionality claim. Id. at 302. His comment that
the statute was irrational, implied, as well, that a rational punishment is sufficient. Id. at
307. This conclusion is false. The punishment must not only be rational, but decent. See
note 162 supra and accompanying text.
388. 445 U.S. at 276.
389. Allen, Retribution in a Modern Penal Law- The Princileof AggravatedHarm, 25
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 16-22 (1925).
390. H. HART, supra note 114, at 130; Allen, supra note 389, at 13; Strahorn, The Effect of
Impossibility on CriminalAttempts, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966-69 (1930).
391. The Court's claim that Rummel's "seriousness of offense" argument is subjective is
similarly unpersuasive. The fact that a bright line is absent between theft of $500 and theft
of $501 does not mean that one does not exist between $500 and $5,000,000. Other less
significant errors are noteworthy. First, Chief Justice Burger erroneously stated in oral argument that the proportionality concept was introduced in the death penalty cases. Oral Argument, supra note 1,at 18. Secondly, the Court's comments about prosecutorial discretion
being used to screen out "truly 'petty' offenders" is arguably wrong. See note 81 supra and
accompanying text. It is not clear how prosecutors can screen out such "truly" petty cases if
such a label is inherently speculative. The fact that prosecutors do not enforce the recidivist
laws in most cases may prove only that the laws are usually too extreme. The courts should
not rely on the prosecutors to do the job of assuring fairness. See Beck v. Alabama, 444 U.S.
897 (1979) (jury discretion does not take the place of properly worded jury instructions in
death penalty cases). Moreover, there is much reason to suspect that recidivist laws are used
as often by prosecutors to pressure suspects to plead guilty as to screen out petty cases. Eg.,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). In any case, it does not follow that because a
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b. ProperAnalysis of Rummel's Petition. The Court should have attempted to decide the range of proportionate punishment for first-time
theft. Enhancement beyond the maximum proportionate punishment
would obviously be disproportionate. Substantial disproportionality
would constitute a violation of the eighth amendment. The Court should
have tried to analyze it in as objective a fashion as possible, but without
fear of using nonquantitative data, even though this approach necessitates,
some subjectivity. It should have remained cognizant, however, of the historical importance of allowing states the freedom to experiment and to be
unique.
Interjurisdictional analysis is less subjective than intrajurisdictional
analysis because the latter requires understanding the seriousness of an
offense, which is generally a nonquantitative matter. On the other hand,
interjurisdictional analysis potentially runs afoul of valid concepts of federalism. Complete protection of concepts of federalism and separation of
powers is difficult, however, without abdication of the protection of individual eighth amendment rights. In order to balance these conflicting interests, the Court should have used the following approach.
The first test of disproportionality, one which does not conflict with values of separation of powers or federalism, is that for a state to punish a
lesser-included crime more severely than the basic crime is disproportionate punishment. If the disproportionality is statistically great, such punishment would also be grossly disproportionate. As no valid basis can exist
for such a legislative occurrence, and as such a finding can be resolved in
an entirely objective fashion, a court should start with such an analysis.
Because such a process violates neither separation of powers nor federalism, the burden upon a defendant to prove such a case should be relatively
small.
If there is no violation of this rule, an interjurisdictional analysis of penalties should be attempted. The test would be objective. Federalism is
protected, although imperfectly, by the requirement of gross disproportionality. Because of the federalism problem, however, the burden on the
defendant to prove disproportionality should be greater than under the
primary approach. A court should compare the penalties for the
equivalent crime in other jurisdictions in order to ascertain society's view
of the proportionate punishment. The mean and mode interjurisdictional
392
punishment is relevant, although not determinative, under this analysis.
The average punishment tells something about national evaluation of the
seriousness of a crime. The mode, too, speaks to the numerically most
common attitude regarding its seriousness. The court should be sensitive,
prosecutor may often fulfill his screening function, and that, as a result, he usually prosecutes only nonpetty cases, that therefore any individual case prosecuted is nonpetty. Justice
Stewart described the Texas procedure to be "uncontrolled, uncontrollable, and standardless
discretion" which is unappealable. Oral Argument, supra note 1,at 38-39. See also note 286
supra for other substantive errors or intentional distortions by the Court.
392. The median is not useful, of course, because by definition half of all tested jurisdictions necessarily must be above the median.
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as well, to clusters of punishment in a given range. On the basis of these
factors the court should be able objectively to set the presumptively proportionate punishment. Any punishment higher than that figure would be
presumptively disproportionate. If the acutal punishment is substantially
greater than that figure it would also be presumptively grossly disproportionate. Such a finding of unconstitutionality, however, should be rebuttable by the state. It could demonstrate, for example, the existence of unique
nonutilitarian circumstances in a region that make the seriousness of the
and thereby show the need
crime more severe in that part of the country
39 3
for local or regional jurisdictional analysis.
Just as the interjurisdictional proportionality figure may be rebutted by
the state, so, too, should a finding of proportionality, or a finding of no
gross disproportionality, be rebuttable by the defendant. A defendant may
be objectively able to demonstrate that interjurisdictional proportionality
analysis is inappropriate because the premise on which such analysis is
ordinarily based is invalid. Interjurisdictional evaluation only works if
one can assume that states as a whole set punishment in an unprejudiced
fashion. Laws may have been written during an historical period of passion or prejudice, however, since which time there may have been objective verifiable changes in attitudes regarding the seriousness of the
crime, 394 or the crime generally may be one peculiarly subject to prejudice
and emotionalism. 395 If any of these situations are proved by the defendant, the presumptive finding of interjurisdictional proportionality might be
rebutted.
The final analysis, application of its own judgment, is an approach that
the Court must conduct in any case in which the first two techniques result
in a conclusion of nongross disproportionality or in an unclear result. Because this test is nonquantifiable and far more subjective, the burden on
the defendant should be heavy. Because a quantifiable approach is not
involved, this process should also require a finding of "immediately apparent" disproportionality. 396 Under this approach the Court would apply
the proper proportionality analysis of harm and blameworthiness and decide whether the punishment inflicted is so obviously excessive that it
shocks the court's conscience and should therefore be viewed as unconstitutional.
Texas's treatment of Rummel would be unconstitutional under this ap393. For example, in a state whose economy may be agricultural, injury to farm land
may be deemed more harmful to society than similar injury in a predominately industrial
community. A state may also empirically prove that its populous views some crimes as
substantially more egregious than the nation as a whole. But see note 395 infra and accompanying text.
394. The laws pertaining to airplane hijacking, for instance, were written during a time
of very frequent hijacking; the penalties established under these laws may be hard to justify
in calmer times. Similarly, a modem jurisdiction that continued to impose the penalty of
hanging for the crime of horse theft should not be able to justify the law on the basis of the
supreme importance of the horse in the era of enactment.
395. Crimes pertaining to homosexual conduct are indicative.
396. Seep. lll0supra.
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proach. Texas itself set the maximum punishment for Rummel's third
crime at ten years. As Rummel's recidivism is irrelevant, the life imprisonment meted out is certainly grossly disproportionate using such an intrajurisdictional approach. 397 Applying an interjurisdictional approach,
the mean maximum punishment for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses
among the thirty-five states treating it as a felony was 8.5 years. 398 It is
obviously less if one includes those states that treat it as a misdemeanor.
The mode is ten years. 399 Life imprisonment is substantially greater than
either of those figures. Even if one accepted the Court's assumption of the
validity of enhancement of recidivists' punishment, proper interjurisdictional analysis would still result in a presumed finding of gross disproportionality. In twenty-nine states no enhancement would have been possible
in Rummel's case. In the forty-seven states in which terms of years are set,
the mean maximum mandatory punishment would have been approximately seven years. 40 Only two other states punish recidivists like Texas
does. Since Texas did not offer in rebuttal special circumstances to discount these findings, Texas's treatment of Rummel should have been considered unconstitutional, even with jurisprudentially incorrect allowance
of recidivist enhancement.
D. InappropriateAdversarialArguments
The briefs filed by the parties were well-written, demonstrating thorough legal research. Rummel's brief in particular was outstanding. It was
extensively researched, including a monumental 204-page supplementary
brief cataloging habitual offender laws in all fifty states from 1776 until
1980. The brief thus made available to the Court all the objective historical evidence necessary for it to consider the issue. Rummel also cited
much legal and penological literature critical of the policies underlying the
habitual offender laws.
Nonetheless, as in other lines of cases implicating distributive justice, the
397. Rummel's possibility of parole in 12 years cannot make this case one of "12 years
for a three time felon." Even Rehnquist acknowledged this fact. 445 U.S. at 280. Justice
Rehnquist would not, however, ignore the possibility, "however slim," that Rummel might
be released early. Id. at 281. The effect of such a treatment is necessarily to complicate the
analysis. See note 424 infra and accompanying text. Release on parole is generally not a
constitutional right. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1 (1979). Rummel's legal right to be released before he dies is no greater than the right of a
death row inmate to be pardoned. See 445 U.S. at 294 (Powell, J., dissenting). Moreover, as
the attorney general of Texas conceded in oral argument, even if paroled, Rummel might be
returned to prison for the rest of his life for a traffic violation. "Yes sir, it can be for any
violation of the law, no matter how trivial." Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 31. Under
such circumstances, the Court should have realistically treated Rummel's sentence as life
imprisonment. Indeed, if Rummel was sentenced to life because he could not conform his
conduct to the law, it makes little utilitarian sense to release him early. This approach is
used by most courts. Note, Disproportionalityin Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1119, 1128 (1979).

398. This figure is based on averaging the maximum penalties. 445 U.S. at 269 n.9.
399. Id. at 270 n.10.
400. These figures are based on calculations using the information presented by Rummel
in his 204-page supplementary charts presented to the Court.
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concepts of the principle of personhood were not always handled properly
by the parties, and adversarial strategy may have negatively affected the
result. Neither party instructed the Court regarding the nonutilitarian nature of proportionality. Not surprisingly, Texas argued that utilitarianism
was a valid issue in the case. 40 1 Rummel, however, did not rebut this argument, and, in view of his concession regarding recidivist laws, appeared to
agree generally with this faulty premise. 40 2 By conceding the validity of
recidivist-enhancement statutes, Rummel thereby lost the opportunity to
force the Court to confront its previously poorly analyzed recidivist cases.
He failed to educate the Court regarding the nonutilitarian features of the
principle of personhood. Moreover, Rummel's second concession, in
which he granted that Texas could treat false pretenses as a felony, served
to undercut his case further. Once he conceded that Texas could treat false
pretenses as a felony and could also enhance the punishment, he gave the
state too much. He conceded more than was necessary as a matter of principle and, crucially, more than he could strategically afford to concede because his dual concessions blurred considerably the line between what
Texas could do and what it did do. The concessions made it possible for
Justice Rehnquist to treat Rummel's claims as almost de minimus.
Although it was not pointed out in the opinion, Rummel philosophically
also gave up too much on the issue of judicial deference. Rather than
he
calling on the Court to protect the principles of personhood in all cases,
40 3 of
told them in argument that they "ought not to consider the issue"
proportionality if his crimes had involved violence, drugs, or tax viola'40 4
tions, or any other crime involving a "peculiarly strong [state] interest.
Even if he meant only that a finding of gross disproportionality would be
a case, this concession was unnecessary and very
inappropriate in40 such
5
possibly wrong.
V.

THE FUTURE

A. Proportionalityand the Legislature
Rummel did not overrule Weems. It is still a precept of justice that punishment be proportionate to the severity of the offense. In addition, Rummel did not invalidate the nonconstitutional principle of personhood.
401. Respondent's Brief, supra note 294, at 13-18.
402. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 27, 29; Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 7, 9, 17.

403. Oral Argument, supra note I, at 6.
404. Id. at 6, 8.
405. It bears reiteration that the author in no way is questioning the competency or dedication of Rummel's appellate counsel. To the contrary, counsel excelled in both categories.
Rather, the author is making two points. First, factually, and with hindsight, it is clear that
Rummel's concessions served as an excuse by the Court to avoid confronting head-on its
previously questionable decisions. Secondly, counsel either accepted, incorrectly, in the author's opinion, the philosophical premise that punishment of recidivists may be enhanced,
or, more plausibly, chose not to attack this commonly held misconception. It is the author's
belief, however, that lawyers should, whenever possible, force courts to question such a philosophical premise. Otherwise, substantive criminal law doctrine will remain as decadent as
Professor Packer has previously accused it of being. Packer, supra note 179, at 121.

1118

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

Legislative bodies, therefore, should still seek to set punishment consistent
with these concepts. The effect of Rummel ought to be to increase the pressure on conscientious legislative bodies to ensure such proportionality.
The "source and its sustaining force" of proportionality 4 6 must be in the
legislature. The legislature can no longer act with the assurance that judicial review will prevent excesses.
B. Proportionality, the Judiciary, and Imprisonment
After Rummel judicial enforcement of the proportionality doctrine in
cases attacking the length of a person's incarceration is unlikely. Nonetheless, an attorney should not forego such a legal argument. Although the
ambiguities of the opinion in Rummel make predictions highly speculative,
a careful reading offers a few hints.
In a Rummel-type case insufficient objective criteria exist by which a
federal court can enforce the proportionality doctrine against a state statute, and therefore the Supreme Court will not intervene to declare unconstitutional a state statute in such a case. The question is, however, what is
a Rummel-type case? Rummel may be characterized as a "length of incarceration" case, but enigmatic footnote 11 explains that the proportionality
407
doctrine "comes into play" in some length-of-incarceration situations.
1. Recidivist Laws. Habitual offender laws are more nearly immune from
constitutional scrutiny, particularly on a proportionality ground, than regular incarceration statutes. This situation was evident prior to Rummel in8
4
light of the Court's previously cavalier treatment of such legislation. 0
406. Perhaps the ambiguities will encourage lower courts to conduct end-sweeps around
the Rummel opinion. Early published results of post-Rummel litigation are as inconsistent
as the opinion itself. Various courts have interpreted Rummel generally to exclude judicial
intervention in non-death-penalty proportionality cases. E.g., Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F.
Supp. 967, 974 (C.D. Ill. 1980); State v. Smith, 268 S.E.2d 276, 277 (S.C. 1980). Two other

jurisdictions, however, not only interpreted Rummel as permitting judicial oversight, but
chose to continue such scrutiny. Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980);
State v. McDaniel, 228 Kan. 172, 612 P.2d 1231 (1980).

Terrebonne went so far as to conclude that Rummel permits continued application by the
Fifth Circuit of the three-prong test used in Rummel. 624 F.2d at 1368. Although the opinion was jurisprudentially sound, see note 367 supra, this interpretation of Rummel is incor-

rect. It quoted the Court's acceptance of interjurisdictional analysis as not inherently
flawed, see note 82 supra and accompanying text, but it ignored both the Court's apparent
rejection of the intrajurisdictional and "seriousness of offense" tests, see notes 65-73 supra
and accompanying text, and its refusal to permit any result that violates principles of federalism. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
407. 445 U.S. at 274 n.ll; see note 55 supra and accompanying text.

408. The general constitutionality of recidivist laws has been regularly upheld. Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (double jeopardy, ex post facto); Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U.S. 616 (1912) (eighth amendment, double jeopardy, privileges and immunities clause);
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901) (eighth amendment, double jeopardy, ex
post facto); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (eighth amendment, double jeopardy).
The constitutionality of particular recidivist laws was litigated in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962) (no violation of due process or equal protection); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (involuntary sterilization violated equal protection clause); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (no violation of equal protection); McDonald v. Massachusetts,
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Rummel does nothing to dispel this attitude. The Court does not expressly
claim, however, that all recidivist statutes are immune from its eighth
amendment proportionality scrutiny. Indeed, it did appear to scrutinize
Rummel's claim by evaluating the voluminous evidence presented before
it deferred. The point at which a criminal becomes a recidivist and the
length of incarceration imposed are "largely within the discretion of the
punishing jurisdiction. ' 40 9 By the use of the word "largely" rather than a
word such as "solely," the Supreme Court appears to have left a door
open.
As a practical matter, however, if any door is nearly closed it is the assailability of recidivist statutes. Rummel had conceded the validity of the
Texas recidivist law and such laws generally. In light of this concession,
the Court did not even have to make as broad a statement regarding legislative discretion as it did. The fact that the Court went out of its way to
express its opinion regarding discretion suggests that the Court will not
look favorably on litigation in this area.
Theoretically, however, two basic legal strategies exist. First is a reeducational strategy. The Court's statement regarding the validity of habitual
offender legislation was based on the false premise that utilitarian factors
were relevant. A lawyer could try to prove to the Court that Rummel was
based on such a false premise and thereby persuade one of the Justices in
the slim majority of five to change his vote. More plausibly, but still unlikely, those who wish to see such laws declared unconstitutional could
look for objective criteria. The Court says there remains "little" 4 10 in the
way of objective standards to judge their constitutionality, thus implying
that a possibility might remain. In light of this comment, any recidivist
law that enhances the penalty for true felonies will not likely be undermined on the grounds of intrajurisdictional or "seriousness of offense"
analysis. The Court did, however, appear to accept interjurisdictional
analysis as valid. This approach was rejected in Rummel only because the
distinctions proved were "subtle rather than gross,"' 41 ' and because, due to
federalist concerns, the interjurisdictional evidence could not be used
alone to declare a penalty unconstitutional.
A lawyer, therefore, would have to meet both the subtlety and federalism objections in order to succeed in an objective criteria challenge. Yet a
180 U.S. 311 (1901) (no violation of equal protection); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673
(1895) (no violation of equal protection).
Particular procedural regularities surrounding such laws were litigated in Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) (no violation in procedure of telling jury during trial of recidivist
allegation); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (right to counsel violated);
Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961) (violation of right to counsel of his own choosing);
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (violation of right to counsel of his own choosing);
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (no violation of right to counsel); Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (no violation although recidivism alleged in information, not
indictment).
409. 445 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).
410. Id. at 281.
411. Id. at 279.
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recidivist statute more susceptible to an objective, bright line finding of
excessiveness than the Texas law as it was applied to William Rummel is
hard to imagine. The Court's list of the factors that made the distinction in
Rummel's case "subtle rather than gross" would likely be present in all
cases today, because the subtlety of Rummel's case inhered in no more
than the nonuniformity of such laws, combined with the "role of
prosecutorial discretion in any recidivist scheme. '41 2 The Court also
seemed to place an intolerably great burden on the defendant when it said
that it was "not entirely convinc[ed]" by the evidence. 41 3 Interjurisdictional analysis, therefore, is not a realistic bright line tool in felony-recidivist cases at this time. It might become a viable analysis at some future
date, however, if, for example, a legislature were to enact an habitual offender law that mandated life imprisonment without possibility of parole
for any two felonies. This punishment could meet the bright line requirement in a case in which the two felonies were particularly minor, especially
if they were of a strict liability nature as in Weems, so that they could be
labeled "trivial."41 4
Even if such a harsh law were enacted, however, it would not be ruled
unconstitutional unless the lawyer could find additional objective support
for its unconstitutionality. An answer may be found in footnote 22 of the
opinion, in which Justice Rehnquist distinguished Rummel from Coker by
noting that the former lacked "contemporary expression of legislative or
public opinion on the question of what sort of penalties should be applied
to recidivists. ' ' 41 5 Such objective evidence, especially in conjunction with
interjurisdictional figures, might support a finding of unconstitutionality.
Public opinion polls could serve to fullfil the need for adequate objective
support of public attitude. Justice Powell believed that such a poll would
4 16
have demonstrated the unfairness of Texas's treatment of Rummel.
Nevertheless, two problems exist. First, polls by national organizations on
this subject are unlikely. Secondly, even if conducted, polls are quickly
outdated and not apt to answer with enough specificity how a given case
should be resolved. Another source of objective support would be evidence of rapid legislative repeal of such laws. At this time, such evidence
is not likely to be found. Current felony-recidivist laws, then, are as a
practical matter presently unsusceptible to proportionality rejection, but
they remain subject to theoretical criticism and possible successful litigation at some future date.
412. Id. at 281.
413. Id. at 278. The Attorney General suggested a more amazing burden in such cases:
punishment is excessive if a "state legislature so recklessly bent on some course of misconduct and so totally unaware of principles established in modern day civilized society...
enact[s] some statute so utterly devoid of any rational justification." Oral Argument, supra
note 1, at 23.
414. This term was used by the Rummel Court to characterize Weems's offenses. 445
U.S. at 274.
415. Id. at 280 n.22.

416. Id. at 307.
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2. Felonies. Does Rummel's federal court deference apply to
nonrecidivist incarceration for all felonies? Despite the Court's "without
fear of contradiction" statement, 41 7 this door is not closed. First, the statement is limited to concededly classified and classifiable felonies. Secondly,
footnote 11 expressly assures the play of proportionality in some felony
cases. 4 18 Thirdly, the Court's language says only that an argument could
be made for the proposition that the length of felony sentences is a matter
of sole legislative prerogative and that such an argument was not contradicted by precedent. It does not say that such an argument was correct. In
fact, the Court expressly left open the door when it said that the line between felony and petty larceny was within the state's prerogative "subject
only to those strictures of the Eighth Amendment that can be informed by
objective factors. ' 41 9 Indeed, the Court expressly reserved the issue of
whether Rummel could have 420
been sentenced to life imprisonment on the
basis of his last felony alone.
Realistically, the possibility of federal court litigation should be more
available with regard to concededly classified and classifiable felonies than
with regard to recidivist laws. 42 1 First, the former case lacks the special
legislative utilitarian interest present in recidivist laws; thus, the enhancement factor is not present. If a felony is defined as the Court did, as a
crime for which a person may receive "significant terms of imprisonment
in a state penitentiary," and in which a significant term of imprisonment
can be as few as two or three years, 422 then the difference between a conceded felony and the actual punishment can be quantitatively great. A
bright line is potentially easier to find.
Secondly, interjurisdictional analysis is not likely to be as complex with
nonrecidivist statutes. The only factor that complicates such a process is
parole. 423 Not all states, however, have parole. At the least, in parole jurisdictions a court could compare the crime to a punishment figure based
on the earliest date upon which a prisoner could be released. In any case,
litigation is possible based on the claim that the time the petitioner has
424
already been incarcerated is cruel and unusual punishment.
Thirdly, intrajurisdictional analysis is not completely ruled out by Rum417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id. at 274.
Id. at 274 n.ll.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 276.
Post-Rummel litigation indicates that the door is being treated as open in some, but

not all, cases. See note 406 supra.
422. 445 U.S. at 274.

423. This complicating feature is evident in Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363 (5th
Cir. 1980), a post-Rummel opinion. The petitioner was sentenced to prison for life at hard
labor, subject to parole, for a drug offense. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
consider statistics offered in the state's appellate brief regarding the likely term that the

petitioner would serve. Id. at 1369. It remanded the case so that the district court could take
evidence on the parole issue. Although the Fifth Circuit conceded that the average term of
years for drug offenders is a relevant factor, it considered the inference that the petitioner
would serve only that length to require a "logical leap" in reasoning. Id. at n.13.
424. Eg., In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
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mel,notwithstanding the fact that the opinion directed that such comparison is inherently speculative. At issue in Rummel was a recidivist law that
made it harder to conduct an intrajurisdictional comparison. The Court
pointed to that difficulty as significant. 425 One can only compare the habitual offender law to nonrecidivist statutes, a comparison of arguably incomparable items, or undertake a comparison of different individual
recidivists punished under the same statute, a necessarily difficult analytical process. In an actual nonrecidivist case, however, it is difficult to
believe, and thus unwise to assume, that the Court would treat all intrajurisdictional analysis as speculative. At the least, lesser included offenses must be punished less severely than the basic offense itself. Also, a
majority of the current Court would not be likely to claim that rational
people disagree as to whether theft of a small amount of money merits
greater punishment than, for example, murder by torture. Fourthly, significant research exists concerning public attitudes toward the comparative
seriousness of various crimes. 426 Additional research in this area is far
easier when it does not involve the complicated features of recidivism.
Nonetheless, despite such hopeful distinctions, proportionality challenges to sentences imposed upon felons are not likely to meet great success except in cases involving lesser included offenses. The Court's
intrajurisdictional language is particularly discouraging. Its statement that
seriousness of an offense is not a line, but a plane, seems to suggest that
even the murder by torture/theft line is blurred. Certainly anything much
less extreme is apt to be too speculative. 427 Without the presence of recent
public opinion or social science literature on the subject, a lawyer will confront the same federalism argument that prevents success in recidivist
cases.
With felonies not conceded to be classifiable, however, the door has not
only not been expressly closed, but seems to be left wide open by the
Court. If meaning is to be found for footnote 11, it comes by putting it in
its context at the end of a sentence that speaks of "concededly classified
and classifiable. . . felonies. ' 428 The Court probably meant that overtime
parking is not properly classified as a felony and that if it were the
Supreme Court would intervene on a proportionality ground.
How meaningful is this limit to court deference, however? First, even in
this "extreme example" 429 Justice Rehnquist does not say that gross disproportionality was present. He said only that "[tlhis is not to say that a
proportionality principle would not come into play. ' 430 This double negative tells us at most that some proportionality principle (perhaps not
425. 445 U.S. at 282-83 n.27.
426. See, e.g., note 265 supra.
427. Nonetheless, one post-Rummel opinion incorrectly calls for continued use of intrajurisdictional analysis under circumstances not greatly different from Rummel. See note
406 supra.
428. 445 U.S. at 274.
429. Id. at 274 n. 11.
430. Id.
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Weems?) would be applicable, and that the Court would apply such a
principle. The Court does not say that life imprisonment for overtime
parking is disproportionate punishment, much less that it is grossly so.
Secondly, even assuming that footnote 11 was intended to suggest that a
claim of disproportionality would be successful in the extreme example,
the extreme example is, indeed, exceptionally extreme. The footnote does
not clarify whether punishing the overtime parker for any significant term
of years less than life in a state penitentiary would be grossly disproportionate. An arguable line may be drawn between cases of life imprisonment and all lesser terms of years. The lower court in Rummel expressly
suggested the validity of such a distinction, pointing out that
a sentence to imprisonment for life now stands in the place where the
death penalty stood earlier in this century-the ultimate punishment
imposed by this society for those crimes most abhorrent to it. Therefore, the question of the proportionality of Rummel's life sentence
. . . deserves a consideration which may be unnecessary for a lesser
sentence.

43 '

Statements made by Justice Stevens in oral argument in Rummel indicate
that he too may have felt such a line was relevant. 4 32 Also more than
coincidence may be the fact that the Court viewed the disproportionality
found in Weems and Coker as "considerably clearer" 433 than any constitutional distinction "between one term of years and a shorter or longer term
of years,

' 434

rather than contrasting those cases with a life sentence.

Such a line, however, is unrealistic. In light of the number of states that
still inflict the penalty of death, 435 life imprisonment does not stand in the
same place as capital punishment. Certainly in a state like Texas, which
maintains a large number of persons on death row, 436 life imprisonment
bears a closer resemblance to a term of years, especially with a possibility
of parole. The irrevocability of death also distinguishes the death penalty
from life imprisonment, even without parole. Yet, in light of the Court's
desire to avoid inherently speculative tests, justifying special treatment for
individuals sentenced to life imprisonment in view of the differing ages
and speculative life spans of individual prisoners is difficult. A term of
years can often be as significant as life imprisonment. Notwithstanding the
inappropriateness of such a distinction, however, life imprisonment is obviously a more serious punishment than some "significant [term] of imprisonment," such as a two- or three-year punishment. This latter
punishment, even for the overtime parker, might not violate the eighth
amendment.
431.

568 F.2d 1193, 1196 (5th Cir. 1978).

432. See, e.g., Oral Arsument, supra note I, at 33: "QUESTION (STEVENS): If you
did apply proportionality, if the sentence here were properly viewed as a life sentence rather

than one of ten or twelve years, would you agree that that would be excessive?"
433. 445 U.S. at 275.
434. Id.
435. As of 1979 there were 37 such states. See Dressler, supra note 112, at 46 n.183.
436. In 1979, 122 of the nation's 522 to 533 death row inmates were in Texas prisons. Id.
at 61-62.
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Thirdly, not at all obvious is whether the present Court would prohibit
life imprisonment for a recidivist traffic offender. Footnote 11, based on
an example suggested by Rummel in oral argument, 437 involved only a
first-time offender. In oral argument, Chief Justice Burger seemed to focus
on that fact. 4 38 The Court's particularly deferential attitude in recidivist
cases could apply to uphold the punishment in such an example.
Beyond these limits on footnote 11, proportionality cannot serve as a
practical limit on legislative action unless one can decide what inherently
is a "felony," so that it can be said that a given "felony," punished by life
or less, is improperly classified as such, thereby triggering the exception in
footnote 11. With the very modem trend toward retributive, morally
based legislation, one would expect a strengthening of the line between
felonies and nonfelonies. In fact, however, the opposite is the case. At
common law the line was clear and manifested the "common sense separation between offenses which [sprang] from wickedness of character and
those which [did] not. '439 All felonies were mala in se. 440 Nonfelonies
were usually mala prohibita."' Gradually, this line blurred, so that today
no such morally based distinction is possible. Some mala in se offenses are
treated as nonfelonies; some mala prohibita laws are, even without a mens
rea, felonies." 2 Also, some mala prohibita
laws no doubt may properly be
443
identified as involving serious harm.
The definitional line between felonies and petty offenses is now positivistic. A felony is either a crime for which one may be incarcerated in a
state prison, as distinguished from a lesser punishment such as incarceration in a county jail or no incarceration, or is based on the length of incarceration no matter what the situs. 4 4 Neither definition can serve as a basis
for Rummel line-drawing, of course. Use of the latter definition to decide
a proportionality claim would be circular, and the former is not a meaningful distinction because the stigma of a significant term of years in a
county jail is not inherently objectively different from that of an equal
term in a state prison. 44 5
Because legislatures have lost sight of the common law distinction between felonies and petty offenses, one must look to the Supreme Court for
437. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
438. Id.
439. Petition of Schlau, 41 F. Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
440. R. PERKINS, supra note 124, at 9. "Mala in se" means "wrong in themselves." Inherently immoral acts are mala in se.
441. Id. at 12. "Mala prohibita" means "wrong because prohibited." Acts that are not
inherently immoral and are wrong only because statutorily forbidden are mala prohibita.
442. The crimes involved in early Supreme Court strict liability litigation were felonies.
See note 177 supra.

443. "A high official in a large corporation can commit undeniably serious crimes inthe
area of. . .clean air or water standards ...." 445 U.S. at 275.
444. R. PERKINS, supra note 124, at 12-13.
445. Jail time is perceived by the public as less severe than prison time. Erickson &
Gibbs, supra note 350, at I11. This perception will affect calculation of the appropriate

"proportional punishment." It does not follow, however, that the crime for which one is sent
to jail is viewed as less morally serious merely because a jail sentence is chosen.
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guidance. Prior case law, however, offers no help. Robinson could have
been a starting point, for it could have stood for the proposition that no act
can be criminalized that is not morally based. That is, Robinson might
have established a requirement of harm, mens rea, and a voluntary act. It
was not so interpreted. All Robinson held was that a state cannot criminally punish involuntarily caused social harm.446 Likewise, the strict liability cases could have called for a requirement of mens rea in all criminal
prosecutions, or could have required mens rea as a prerequisite to the labeling of a crime as a felony. Instead, they upheld the treatment of strict
liability crimes as felonies, punishable by significant terms of years in a
state penitentiary."4 7 If one cannot, according to Rummel, draw meaningful lines as to the seriousness of offenses on the basis of the presence or
absence of violence or the nature or amount of property injured, taken, or
even risked, then one cannot apparently draw the line to create a clear
division between a true felony and a petty offense.
Footnote 11, to have any real meaning, will put pressure on the Court to
look at the core of the criminal law in order to decide what makes a criminal act a felony. In view of its history of avoiding such issues, or of handling them in an insensitive or confused fashion, the promise of
meaningful analysis is slim. In light of a legal profession's general dislike
for litigation premised on philosophical grounds, such litigation will probably not be argued in proper fashion.
If the Court does confront the issue and thereby avoid rendering footnote 11 meaningless, it may need to reconsider prior nonproportionality
distributive justice cases, most particularly strict liability case law. If it
does not choose to reconsider prior decisions, or if it affirms them, no principled line appears to exist between legitimate felonies and mere petty offenses. Footnote 11 may stand for nothing more than the observation that
the imposition of some punishment for some crimes irrespective of any
utilitarian justification, cannot be countenanced because that imposition
would "shock the conscience" of the community. 44 8 Perhaps the test
comes close to that suggested by the State of Texas in oral argument: the
punishment "must have a rational basis supported by civilized thought
that is thinkable in our system." 449 So understood, footnote 1 's extreme
example is as much explainable in the specific language of the eighth
amendment as it is in terms of the judicially created doctrine of proportionality. Ironically, gross disproportionality would then come to mean
only "immediately apparent disproportionality," and would be found to
exist more as an intuitive subjective reaction than as a result of objective
jurisprudential analysis. In light of the fact that mala prohibita offenses
446. See notes 190-98 supra and accompanying text.

447. See notes 177-88 supra and accompanying text. See generally notes 457-66 infira
and accompanying text.
448. Accord, In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226
(1972) ("so disproportionate... that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental no-

tions of human dignity").
449. Oral Argument, supra note 1,at 36.
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are now punishable by significant terms of years, footnote 11 may only be
applicable in cases of infliction of life imprisonment for the most petty of
mala prohibita offenses, ones for which only minor fines would seem appropriate.
C. Federal Versus State Legislation
Proportionality remains alive, but not well, in state length-of-incarceration cases. Its health may be no better with federal legislation. Rummel is
concerned with the dual doctrines of separation of powers and federalism.
The first doctrine should apply equally to punishment inflicted as a result
of federal legislation. The latter concern, however, is irrelevant to congressional legislation.
Much of the language in Rummel was nonspecific on this point. The
Court spoke of "reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment ' ' 450 and stated that the "line-drawing process . . . is pre-eminently the province of the legislature." '45' In addition, the Court quoted a
Supreme Court case that involved federally imposed punishment, stating
that "whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment
• . . these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy. '452 Finally, the
Court remarked that recidivist punishment is "largely within the discretion
of the punishing jurisdiction. ' 453 Naturally, deference justified by notions
of separation of powers applies equally to federal and state legislation.
Nonetheless, proportionality should remain a more viable doctrine with
federal legislation. Although the speculativeness of the intrajurisdictional
and "seriousness of offense" tests remains, the interjurisdictional test is
more feasible in a federal case. If Congress sets punishment significantly
higher than the great majority of its constituent states, the legislation
should be far more subject to a finding of unconstitutionality because such
a conclusion would violate no federalist theory.
D. Federal Versus State Courts
The concept of proportionate punishment can remain a justiciable issue
in the state, as distinguished from the federal, courts. The legal profession
should take the opportunity to educate state courts regarding errors in the
majority opinion. Sympathetic state courts have two alternatives to the
Rummel opinion. First, they can apply their own state constitution, where
applicable, to require proportionate punishment.4 54 Secondly, as Rummel
is a decision of abstention rather than legal principle, the eighth amendment still incorporates a proportionality principle. Therefore, a state court
can choose to be less deferential than the Supreme Court and apply the
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

445 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 282 n.27 (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
445 U.S. at 285.
Eg., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
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extant precept of justice. 4 55 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's opinion supports
this deferential treatment. Rummel stated that changes in sentencing procedure must find their source "in the legislatures, not in the federal
courts." While a federal court may be hesitant to declare state legislation
unconstitutional because of its concern of chilling federalist experimentation and diversity, a state court does not share this rationale for deference.
Although separation of powers may argue for caution by a state court, the
interjurisdictional test should serve as a valid basis for declaring one's own
law disproportionate.
E. Effect of Rummel on Other Concepts of Substantive Criminal Law
1. Defning Crimes. Professor Henry Hart has written:
Despite the unmistakable indications that the Constitution means
something definite and . . . serious when it speaks of "crime," the
Supreme Court of the United States has hardly got to first base in
working out what that something is. From beginning to end, there is
scarcely a single opinion by any member of the Court which confronts
456
the question in a fashion which deserves intellectual respect.
As already noted, 457 neither the mens rea nor the excuse cases took the
opportunity to define the nature of "crime" in a society founded on a personhood principle. Although the Winshiq line of cases 458 may be viewed
as merely procedural, burdens of proof are not only often determinative of
outcome, but also profoundly impact upon matters of substance. Patterson
limited Mullaney's interpretation of Winship by requiring that the government carry the burden of persuasion only as to prima facie elements of
crimes. After Patterson, therefore, a legislature can label a previously
prima facie element of a crime as an affirmative defense, and thereby constitutionally shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. The obvious
danger of Patterson, of course, is that without limits on the meaning of
''crime," virtually any "element" could become a defense.
Patterson did set limits to such abuse. It expressly stated that a legislature may not declare an individual presumptively guilty of crime, nor may
it upon the finding of an indictment or proof of the identity of the accused,
presume the presence of all elements of a crime. 459 These limits, of course,
are meaningless unless one defines the nature of a crime. In the absence of
such a definition, the limits expressed in Patterson would not preclude a
legislature from defining murder as merely the voluntary killing of a
human being and then permitting as a defense proof that the defendant's
455. One state court has already so interpreted Rummel. State v. McDaniel, 228 Kan.
172, 612 P.2d 1231 (1980). The decision stated that under Rummel, "we are not requiredby
the 8th Amendment" to conduct proportionality analysis. 612 P.2d at 1242 (emphasis in
original). Nonetheless, it did, although for good measure it interpreted its own constitution
to so require it. Id. See also notes 406, 454 supra and accompanying text.
456. Hart, supra note 13, at 431 (footnotes deleted).
457. See text accompanying notes 177-228 supra.
458. See text accompanying notes 199-213 supra.
459. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
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actions were nonmalicious. Nor would it prevent a state from making it a
crime to drive an automobile, leaving as a defense the fact that the person
was licensed and drove safely.
If due process is not to lose its meaning, however, a more significant
limitation than expressly offered by Patterson is needed. The most plausible limitation suggested by commentators is that a legislature could properly transfer an element of a crime to the defense to the extent that the
maximum punishment mandated by the statute is not grossly disproportionate to the crime as defined in the prima facie case.4 60 Rummel, of
course, impinges on this suggestion. Although proportionality is constitutionally required, it is not likely to be any more viable in a Patterson case
than it was in Rummel. Even if the Supreme Court accepted proportionality as a theoretical limit on legislative action in the shifting of the burden
of persuasion, the same factors calling for deference in an eighth amendment case would require it in a due process framework. If Patterson is not
to serve as an invitation to legislative abuse, another limit must be found,
and it must be found by determining the inherent nature of a crime. As
with the question of what is a felony, the Court offers little guidance in this
area.
In Patterson, however, the Court demonstrated its awareness of the fact
that the definition of crime is the crucial question by citing two other cases
that make "the point [of limits] with sufficient clarity. ' '46' Unfortunately,
the cases cited offered no answers. One case involved a statute that made
it a crime for aliens to occupy land for agricultural purposes. 4 62 Because
the statute authorized that upon proof of occupation of such lands and
allegation of alienage the burden was upon the defendant to prove his citizenship, it was declared unconstitutional. The Court stated that a burden
of proof could be shifted only when "the state shall have proved enough to
make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved
with excuse or explanation. ' '463 In that case, the burden of proof was 'un'464
just because the lease of land conveyed "not even a hint of criminality.
The case contained little clarification of this point. Likewise, in the other
cited case, 46 5 the Supreme Court held only that the shifting of the burden
of persuasion may not offend "some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. ' '466 Thus, it appears that in defining a prima facie case a legislature
must minimally require proof of some criminality. Criminality, however,
apparently does not require a mens rea, so the state need only prove that
the defendant did something that caused harm. The question of what is
460. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1365-97 (1979).

461. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
462. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
463. Id. at 88-89.
464. Id. at 90.

465. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
466. Id. at 523 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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harm then remains. Furthermore, while the legislature must not act so as
to offend some fundamental principle of justice, the perimeters of this limitation remain wholly undefined.
The answer to these questions, of course, can only be found by analysis
of philosophical questions in the context of the principle of personhood
and can only be resolved if the judiciary is willing to review legislative
action. Rummel will either force the Court to do what it does not wish to
do, or it will leave legislatures with unlimited power in the defining of
crimes and the placement of burdens of persuasion.
2. Strict Liability and Excuses. Rummel had no direct effect on either of
these lines of distributive justice decisions. It did undercut efforts, however, to change the Court's direction in these areas. A significant argument
against previous strict liability decisions was that they permitted disproportionate punishment. This claim, never argued before, is now virtually
lost. Rummel, more dramatically than any prior case of distributive justice, displayed the Court's unwillingness to intrude very far into the substantive criminal law. If the Court will not seriously review legislatively
mandated punishment, it is even more unlikely that it will incorporate the
law of defenses, which goes to the very core of substantive criminal law
doctrine, into the Constitution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Rummel v. Estelle represents a substantial departure from Weems and
Coker, but is consistent with an unhealthy trend in Supreme Court adjudications of issues implicating matters of substantive criminal law. Rummel
demonstrates more clearly than any prior case the Court's insensitivity to
the importance of the concept of distributive justice, its fear of or disinterest in philosophical adjudication, and its lack of sound understanding of
various basic jurisprudential doctrines.
The effect of Rummel on the modern effort to create a constitutional
principle of just punishment will be substantial. Disproportionate punishment is a widespread fact. Its existence is damaging to society and to the
individual imprisoned. Even Chief Justice Burger has condemned the
"lock them up and throw the keys away" mentality as creating more
problems than it solves. 467 Rummel treats recidivists as virtual outcasts.
Although such treatment is against the rule of Weems, no umpire is willing
to enforce that rule. One can only hope that efforts will be made by lawyers to open wider the doors not fully shut and that the Supreme Court
will not reject such efforts.
The effect of Rummel upon efforts to reform the substantive criminal
law can be staggering, particularly in the definition of crimes and in the
incorporation of mens rea and defenses into the Constitution. Substantive
criminal law will stagnate unless the legislature is willing to act conscien467. Burger, Our Options are Limited, 18 VILL. L. REV. 165, 167 (1972).
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tiously and in informed fashion or the judiciary becomes willing to handle
philosophical issues and to become learned in jurisprudence. The legal
profession has a duty to realize the importance of these doctrines and to
help educate both branches of government.

